John Gabusi was born in Florence, Arizona, in 1941 and raised in Clifton. He studied and taught political science at the University of Arizona before co-founding Behavioral Research, a public opinion polling firm, with classmate Earl DeBerg. In 1966 he began working for Arizona Congressman Morris K. Udall in a variety of capacities, including managing his 1976 bid for the democratic presidential nomination. He left Udall’s employ in 1977 to work for the Community Services Administration. He was then asked to help organize and establish the new Department of Education, where he later became assistant secretary for management. After Republican Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency, he went to work for Control Data Corporation in Minnesota. In 2002 he accepted the job of Vice Chancellor at Pima Community College in Tucson, where he has remained since.
JF: One of the things that I want to back up to, the congressional office, for just a minute. In 1973 through 1976, there were a lot of congressional staff changes. One was you became special assistant, which is what Bob Reveles had been.

JG: Again, we made up titles as we went along.

JF: That’s what I was going to say. What is a special assistant?

JG: Nothing. It meant that I was…. I’m sure we sat around one day and maybe I had a card that said, “Staff Director, Postal Subcommittee.” And somebody said, “Well, you know, you really need—we got all this lobbying thing, maybe we should change your title.” So we’d come up with a new title. Same thing, it’s just….

JF: Had Bob Reveles left then?

JG: Could have been. Bob was in and out. That is, he was on our payroll. Sometimes he was there, and then he…. He and Ella sometimes didn’t hit it off, and he would go work for Frank Thompson or something. I don’t really know. I just know that Bob worked for Mo the most after I left, I think, in the later seventies—I think.

JF: He wasn’t there when I worked there.

JG: That’s right. I’m not sure he was there until later.

JF: Okay. Well, the other was Terry Bracy took over as legislative assistant, and Dick Olson was gone.

JG: That’s when Ella—he went over to work for the then Speaker and majority leader Jim Wright. What happened was he and Ella had a blow-up. God knows what precipitated it, because you never knew. And Dick, I guess Mo and he came to an understanding. And the chief speech writer for Jim Wright of Texas was a good friend of Dick’s, and I’m sure Mo was involved in it. And so Dick went over as chief speech writer for Jim Wright—I guess in the office of the Speaker, I’m not sure. But he left then.

JF: Okay. How did the rest of the staff get along with Ella? Did they sort of walk on eggshells?

JG: I think generally that. I don’t know, a couple of the women I think got along with her okay. As I say, I was really quite circumspect. I did not like to be around when she came into the office. I just wanted to stay out of the way. And there was a time when she was very intrusive. As the years went on, I think she got less interested in sticking her face in our face. It may be that their own personal relationship was having problems and whatever.

JF: At the very outset of the campaign, there was you, Terry Bracy, and Stewart, basically—or was he even in it at the outset? I guess what I’m getting at is how did the campaign begin, how did it blossom from a sparkle in your eye to the campaign?
JG: Operationally, Terry and I started the campaign.

JF: And what was your role and his role?

JG: Well, strategizing, both of us, and Mo, and Dick, and Roger to a lesser degree. And then Mo started bringing in certain members of Congress, gathered in his office people like Dave Obey and Lionel Van Deerlin. There were a group of them.

JF: Henry Reuss?

JG: Henry Reuss. Again, the core of the DSG, Democratic Study Group. And they would talk tactics. The main thing was the announcement, how to announce it, how should Mo say that he’s running or contemplating running, whatever. And then the question was what is the organization of it? Stewart, at that point, he and Mo.… Stewart was appointed, however it happened, as the campaign—was it manager or chairman? I forget the phrase.

JF: I have seen both. I always thought of him as campaign chairman. But in the things that have been written since, he’s referred to as campaign manager.

JG: Well, the way it worked was that he was going to be Mo’s advisor. Then they brought me in.

JF: Issues advisor?

JG: Who knows? Mo’s brother. Be Bobby Kennedy to John Kennedy. I mean, who the fuck knows what Stewart said? But that he would be Mo’s chief advisor/counsel, and that he would look at the strategic run of the campaign, and I would be reporting to him. I would be the campaign manager.

JF: But you don’t know how this came about that Stewart . . .

JG: Conversation. How it happened, I don’t know. Sittin’ around drinkin’ a beer? I have no fucking idea. So I said fine, I didn’t care. I wasn’t going to tell Stewart, “No, you can’t.” He didn’t get in the way. Stewart’s biggest contribution—no, I shouldn’t say that—Stewart’s biggest effort, that I saw in the operation of the campaign, was in his efforts to hire two people: one was his son. You know his son had just gotten . . .

JF: Tom Udall?

JG: Scott. You know Scott?

JF: I know Tommy, but not Scott. I know of him.
JG: Okay, well Scott had just gotten—you know, Carter gave a commutation to all the draft resisters in Canada as a result of Vietnam. They were all allowed to come back to the United States.

JF: Oh, right! Okay.

JG: Well, Scott was one of those. People did not know it, but Scott was a draft evader. That would have been Stewart’s son, when Stewart was secretary of the Interior. He’s up there in Canada. It was a huge secret.

JF: I did not know that at the time, and it’s something I learned quite a bit later.

JG: Yes. So anyway, he came to me and he said that Scott was at loose ends, and he would like me to find a place for him in the campaign to do something. So I said fine. We brought Scott in. I met him, and we put him into an area of the direct mail shop, because there was a guy there that ran it that knew, and we figured that if there were going to be either emotional or just behavioral issues, that it wouldn’t fuck up too much. And then a little while later Stewart comes to me and says that he’d like me to hire somebody else. And he has with him this truly anorexic young woman. I mean, she looked like an emaciated—I mean, truly—haggard. She was Scott’s girlfriend.

JF: Do you remember her name?

JG: No, but God, do I remember her face.

JF: Because, you know, when you’re describing her, I’m sort of flashing on something.

JG: I made her like his assistant, or put her in the same area. And that was a mistake, because later on we found out that she was just kiting money and just fucking things up royally. She was a coo-coo head. I mean, the anorexia should have triggered that. So anyway, those were his two most significant moves, as far as I was concerned.

JF: So he really didn’t have much to do?

JG: Oh, no, he would come to—he loved to discuss—he would write memos to Mo, strategic memos like this and that, and this and that. The biggest issue that Stewart and I fought together on was in the midst of the campaign, the beginning of the campaign, we had written a—I, Terry, or [unclear] Stewart, but primarily Terry and I—had written a campaign plan, state by state. And what it showed was, based on our analysis, and we had other people looking at it, and Rick Sterns was into the play by then, we’d known him from McGovern. He was helping us. A guy who does that Friday night….

JF: Ken Bode?
JG: No, the one who does it now, the guy who did the Ohio Primary for us, does the Friday night show on McNeil-Lehrer, he and David Brooks. You know, the round guy on NPR, on national television [i.e., Public Broadcasting].

JF: I’ll have to fill that one in.

JG: Something Brooks. He’s been around forever. He was a young staffer then. He worked for, I think, Ohio. So these were a group of people, and we would go over tactics—electoral votes, turnouts—we’d look at all that stuff state by state, chronologically, based on the schedule of the campaign. And we had concluded that all of our efforts should be in New Hampshire. Because if we pulled it off in New Hampshire, that meant you were going to be on the cover of *Time* and *Life* going into the Massachusetts Primary. At that time, that was the schedule. And then you worked your way south. In those days, you built to the June primary in California—you didn’t just have it there, which it is now. Our entire campaign was premised that Iowa would be a place, but Iowa was not significant.

JF: Well, Iowa, that was the first year that Iowa Caucuses were going to be held in advance of New Hampshire.

JG: Yes. And we had concluded that it was going to be a pimple on the back of something. But we weren’t going to lose; it would not be ultimately transferred into a loss.

JF: If Mo didn’t go there?

JG: That’s right, because there was always enough candidates. Didn’t matter if all those other guys were there, but if he didn’t go, then there wasn’t a race. And that was our plan. And then Mo somehow allowed…. Oh, I can’t remember. This was right about the time I had to leave the campaign. But anyway, Stewart and I wrote a very specific memoranda arguing why he should not be going to Iowa.

It was Ken Bode, was the guy who convinced Mo. He had been writing a few speeches for Mo—he, along with the Boston mafia, John Martilla and these other guys—and argued that he should make an all-out effort in Iowa.

JF: Well, and Jack Quinn was…. 

JG: Jack had been brought over here. Jack had been staff to a senator from Colorado.

JF: Now, you had been strongly against going into Iowa. (JG: Absolutely.) And then you had to leave the campaign?

JG: Yes, I had a personal problem with my wife, and I had to leave for about four months, I guess. I came back right before the Wisconsin Primary.

JF: Jack Quinn came in….
JG: Jack came over as a volunteer staffer, and in that mix of my departure, I think Stewart lost control of key personnel, and that’s when people like Quinn stepped in, Ken Bode stepped in.

JF: Eventually Martilla and Kiley.

JG: Right, and they stepped in, because they weren’t part of it at all prior to my being there. I look back on it with great regret, because I think that my leaving did leave a vacuum that Stewart was not able, or chose not to [fill (Tr.)], or whatever. But in any event, so they’re there convincing Mo that he should reverse what we had been doing for a year, and go all out in Iowa and take money out of New Hampshire. I was being told this almost daily, even though I wasn’t working there, because Terry and Stewart were calling me up as though I were the manager, and saying, “Here’s what’s happening.” And I would then say, “Well, go tell him, you tell him, you’re the [unclear],” X, Y, Z. And I guess they did that, but I wasn’t doing it, because I was actually at that time, had been hired by [actor] Paul Newman to work with a guy named Jim [James F.] Flug, to go after the energy companies, the Seven Sisters, and all that stuff.

JF: So were you still in Washington?

JG: Yes, I was still there.

JF: That must have been very difficult for you to leave the campaign when you were working on it.

JG: Oh, it was awful. It was awful. It was purely personal. I had no…. Either that or my wife at the time. But anyway, they went, they did the wrong thing, we got our asses beat in Iowa anyway. Only by then it was a high profile, Udall and his bus troops through Iowa. You know, all this publicity that didn’t do worth a shit. But what it did do, it took a week out of our New Hampshire schedule, took out all that money, TV and everything we had blanketed New England with that had to be pulled out.

JF: And it gave you one loss.

JG: And we lost it by zip. We came in second in New Hampshire. And we could have won New Hampshire. We could have won it [unclear].

JF: Which would have made a big difference.

JG: Well, it would have been the first one. He would have got on the cover. I was told later on by—oh, Terry would know the guy’s name. He was the lead reporter for Time magazine. And he said Time magazine had written, for the issue after New Hampshire, two cover stories: one on Mo and one on Carter. And Carter got it. But that’s how close it came. And Stewart, to this day…. When I was with you that night at the Udall….

JF: Udall Foundation reception?
JG: When we did that thing. Stewart still says, he comes up, talking to people about our campaign, he’s always talking about Mo’s campaign, he said, “And Johnny and I were the only ones, if they’d listened to us, Mo would be president!” Because he still remembers how wrong they were, and how right we were, and how we were overturned through a crook of fate.

JF: Well, up until then, the campaign had been run by loyalists. I mean, people who had known Mo and were very loyal to him, and had worked with him for a long time, and then….

JG: And we were very careful—I thought I was very careful in hiring as we built our staff. I mean, I thought I hired really good guys, and who were loyal, who didn’t flit around. I mean, guys like Coyle. Coyle was loyal to Mo to the day he died.

JF: Ron Pettine.

JG: Ron Pettine.

JF: Paul Tully.

JG: Paul Tully. And then Paul died. His first winning campaign, when Clinton was elected president.

JF: That’s right, he’d lost all until then. [unclear] couldn’t handle it.

JG: He was political director of the DNC. He won it, and then he dies of a heart attack. But anyway, so they were really good people that were developed. And they all felt that—you know, the pros, the smart-alecks, or whatever they called them, had come in and fucked things up for a while.

JF: Where did Jack Quinn come from?

JG: Well, Jack was a young lawyer, graduate of law school somewhere. He was working for Senator Haskell of Colorado, who was a Democratic senator from Colorado. I can still remember, he and a guy named Matthews—Jessica’s husband, Colin Matthews—they were buddies in the Senate, staff guys. Maybe they went to school together, I don’t know. But literally one day the two of them came together, where Terry and I were, and introduced themselves and said they really wanted to volunteer to help Mo Udall—just as volunteers. That was the first time I met Jack—and Colin, for that matter. So we were looking for volunteers, and we had a routine about start with X, Y, [Z]. And we got to know them. Jack was very interested, active, involved, offered to be an advance man—all the standard things you do if you’re a staffer trying to get into it. We didn’t say no. You never say no at that stage. So they became part of the team, as staff volunteers from another office. But they would show up at the meetings, they would be—I shouldn’t even say “they”—he would,
and Colin to a lesser extent. It sort of just evolved that way—especially, I think, the advance work got him into airplanes where people got to think of him as a staff person.

JF: So when you left, he sort of came into the void?

JG: Ostensibly, Stewart was the campaign chairman—that’s how it was articulated. But then I guess it started disintegrating, because I think there were two or three. Stewart called himself the campaign manager at that point. Somebody appointed Jack. I think they thought of Jack as the guy who can do the nuts and bolts that I might have been doing with our staff.

JF: Logistics and….

JG: But in fact, Jack wanted to be a policy guy. I’ve read the memos that Jack was writing, and they were like Terry Bracy memos. So he saw himself in a different light.

JF: And do you recall how—well, you weren’t with the campaign at the time [unclear].

JG: Well, no, I was talking to them every day, Terry and Stewart. That’s the only way I stayed in touch.

JF: How did Martilla and Kyle then get into it?

JG: I think they were hired guns. I think that Bode—they were all friends from other campaigns.

JF: Did Stewart hire them?

JG: Well, ostensibly Stewart hired everybody. But the way things worked with Mo is somebody would give him a recommendation. Mo did not like—he was not going to interview anybody. So I’m sure somebody said, “You know, John Martilla and Tom Kyle are available. We think they would work perfectly in Iowa. They can do the radio,” blah, blah. Whatever sh*tick that they pulled. He would write back, “okay”—you know how he did, “MKU.” That’s typically the way he would do it. So they would then carry that out and say, “Mo said we should go ahead and do this.” Sometimes, I know that in one case, it was a situation that was later told to me, that Terry didn’t even know about it, because they would just be able to get Mo to do it that way. And I felt the same way.

JF: So they would go around Terry and . . .

JG: Oh, just do things, like they were in charge.

JF: Was it a matter of them (JG: It was a matter of Stewart.) sort of taking over?

JG: Well, yes, it was, and it was a matter that Stewart…. For instance, if I was there, nobody had any authorization to spend any money, if I didn’t have my fingerprint on it—
nobody. And that’s the way it was for campaign expenditures for the states. It was everything. As you know, I was the one they screamed at because they couldn’t get their money. And if Stewart had taken that same position, if he had said, when I left, “All right, I will now be the John Gabusi, and all money has to be approved by me—I mean all money.” But that didn’t happen.

JF: And Stan Kurz wasn’t playing that role?

JG: We’re talking about operating. Now, Stan’s up in New York just making sure that the federal election [unclear] has happened, and the matching funds are processed correctly on all these forms. He was not running daily operations. We had a budget for that, theoretically. But we knew how much we wanted to spend in New Hampshire, and we were budgeting it, and we had what the office…. You know, we had all that down. But I guess, when Stewart did not enforce those kinds of things, the individuals who had an agenda, the guys who wanted to do advertising in Iowa, the guys who wanted to hire the buses for a publicity bus, they would just do it, or they would present a package to Mo. I saw a couple of those memos where “we want to do this in Iowa.” Mainly it was Iowa, because they had made a decision that Iowa, they were going to win. So they were [unclear] him with memoranda as to why they could win, and how they needed the money to do it. And I’ve seen the memos where they’re doing this and saying, “Now, if we do this bus tour, the cost is $18,000, and this is what we get, and the press play we’ll get,” and all that. And then down below it you see, “Okay, MKU.” And they saw that as their voucher to spend $18,000.

JF: So was Mo not aware? I would think that Mo would be used to communicating with either you or Terry or Stewart.

JG: Well, we had actually worked out a pretty good deal on that issue when I was there—Terry and I and Stewart. Stewart and I had a very trusting relationship in that I told Stewart that if I thought there was an expenditure that needed to be made, I would make a judgment. And if I thought it needed his concurrence, he could trust me that that would be the case. So I might buy $20,000 worth of bumper stickers, but I wasn’t buying $20,000 worth of new advertising in New Hampshire. It’s that level of thing. And the same with Terry. So Mo wouldn’t necessarily ask Terry about an expenditure. I would talk to Mo, because that’s what I did. I would talk to him, I would give Stewart and Mo a daily recap of all our revenue, anticipated expenses, what our net would be at the end of every week, because Mo had a thing that he didn’t want Ella to have any sense that we were going in debt. He wanted to see basically a zero sum budget every week. So I could do that, it wasn’t that hard. You fudge a little, but it wasn’t 50% off or anything like that. But the point is, he and I had that relationship. So I suspected when I left, nobody came to him and said, “Here’s….” The only ones who came to him were the ones that wanted to spend money in Iowa and stuff. That’s what I think, I don’t know.

JF: That’s what it sounds like. There was a void there, and they moved into it, and Mo didn’t know the difference necessarily.
JG: Right. And to his credit, he was campaigning.

JF: Right. When you got back into the campaign then, Martilla and Kyle were….

JG: They were back in Boston. I don’t know that they were involved in the campaign in Wisconsin at all. I don’t recall it that way. I got back in the campaign two days before the Wisconsin Primary, in Wisconsin.

JF: And did you come back in the same position that you had been in, basically?

JG: Yes. Well, I think that maybe…. No, I was there. I was asked to come back. I guess Stewart and Terry had talked to Mo and he told them to see if I—I guess he told them, I don’t know that for a fact—see if I was able to get back or not. And I worked it out. So I showed up two days before the Wisconsin Primary. And I was with them the night of the primary when we felt we had won.

JF: What was that like?

JG: I’m sitting in the suite, it’s Ella and Mo and me, Terry, Stan Kurz I think was there. There were eight or nine of us and there were a couple of reporters that he had let in. One was the woman reporter, Elizabeth Drew. Remember her?

JF: Yes.

JG: And I remember sitting next to her on the couch, and talking about this situation, because she was a great lover of Mo’s. And the early returns, we really thought he had won. She was already beginning to talk about an article she would be writing on his resurrection or whatever. And then, of course, it changed.

JF: That must have been incredibly hard.

JG: It really was. It really was.

JF: How did Mo take it?

JG: Well, Mo took it, as Mo does—stoically. He was pissed a little. And then Mo would talk a little bit about the things he might have done in western Wisconsin. A lot of Mo’s vitriol was always directed at these other candidates. Because he knew if he was one-on-one with Carter, he would beat him. But Carter beat him in Wisconsin in the west and the rural areas. And he was still having to fight people like Birch Bayh, and that whole gaggle of left-wingers, as he saw it.

JF: I’ve seen or read reports that if even one of them had dropped out…. 
JG: Any one! Any one in any number of races! I mean, he came in second in Massachusetts. Carter came in fifth, having just won New Hampshire, because Scoop Jackson won in Massachusetts.

JF: And by then, people like Fred Harris didn’t have a chance, but he wouldn’t drop out.

JG: None of them did, but they were egotistical. Their egos would not allow them. I don’t know what went through their heads. Sergent Shriver.

JF: Frank Church.

JG: Yes. So here you had Mo being a consistent second, and a variety of others taking enough bite out of him so that Carter either didn’t run anywhere, or ran first. I mean, who would have said that a guy wins the New Hampshire Primary one week, and the next week, in the adjacent state, even more liberal than New Hampshire, runs fifth? That’s what Carter did, and he still was viable. Now, if we had beat Carter in New Hampshire, we would have beat his ass in Massachusetts. You see, that was the whole strategy.

JF: It does sound like the decision to go into Iowa made a huge, huge miscalculation that must have affected….

JG: Yes.

JF: How did Ella take it after Wisconsin?

JG: Ella would be sarcastic. I can remember her saying [unclear] whole thing, making some sarcastic comment, “Well, maybe Mo will quit now,” or something like that. She was not a great person. She really wasn’t. She was very vindictive. I never much cared for her, and I do not think she was loyal to Mo, in the political sense.

JF: To his ambitions or his….

JG: Yes. She was a cynic, and I don’t think she pumped him up when he needed to be pumped up.

JG: At what point in the campaign did you or others start to notice Parkinson’s, or the effects of the Parkinson’s disease?

JG: I have to tell you I don’t have any memory of it. I was told later that, “Remember when Mo would bend a little?” or something, but I never did.

JF: I wonder if the first signs weren’t maybe when you were gone on the campaign. The only thing I recall is a time when his schedule had to be cut back, when the word just kind of came down to all of us.

JG: You mean the presidential campaign?
JF: Yes.

JG: Could be. It never was presented to me as a medical issue, I guess. The first I knew about it, formally, was when he broke his arms.

JF: After the campaign, when he fell off the roof?

JG: Exactly. In the diagnosis of those breaks, there was a report—I don’t know where I got it, maybe Stewart told me—of some early indications of Parkinson’s.

JF: Well, I don’t think he was actually diagnosed until after the campaign.

JG: Well, that would have been after the campaign, right.

JF: Right. And I do recall Ella coming up to me at one point after the campaign, when I was at some event at their house, and saying that everybody was worried about Mo, people were asking him if he had cancer because he was just moving slower, and everybody was worried, but she couldn’t get him to go to a doctor, other than a chiropractor. So I know there wasn’t a real diagnosis ’til after the campaign. So you never saw any effects in the way he acted, or the way he campaigned, or anything?

JG: No, never.

JF: Okay. At the end of the campaign, did you leave the office right away? Did you stay with the congressional office for a while?

JG: Yes. Well, I stayed with the office ’til Carter was elected. See, what happened was, I went back, same position. We were talking about the next Congress. There was no sense of him leaving, or anything like that.

JF: Did you and Terry do the 1976 congressional campaign?

JG: Yes. Well, actually, by then, I think we actually maybe had a couple people out there doing it, because we were on the other, but we ran it, we were there, and we were there election night and all that stuff. We also had been asked by—same as we had done for McGovern, and because of our involvement in the presidential campaign, we were asked to do a lot of surrogate stuff as staffers, for the Carter campaign. So I did some, Terry did more, because his was much more media-related. He would do press appearances on Carter’s behalf, stuff like that. And primarily in the eastern part of the United States.

JF: And what did you do?

JG: I mainly spent time with the campaign staff in Washington. Jody Powell, besides being press guy, had organized—along with the guy from New Mexico whose name I can
never remember—their operation, and they would ask me to call in to half a dozen states and do certain tasks, money, saying we needed money, or do whatever.

JF: Was it hard for either you or Terry to move over to the Carter campaign?

JG: No. We were doing them a favor. We never thought we were involved. We’d just had our ass beat by them. I wasn’t doing this because I was going to go do something else. It was more of—it’s sort of like being in the military. These are guys you knew on the staff. I’d gotten to know Hamilton Jordan real well, and I kind of knew Jody. So, you know, it was…. So it wasn’t that big a deal to us, it was just doing a favor. But we were doing other work on the campaign in Tucson, and a range of things.

So he gets elected, and we’re there in Washington, and the new people start coming to town. Terry and I are still in our jobs. Brock Adams, who was a member of Congress, part of Mo’s inner circle, a good friend, was selected to be secretary of Transportation. Terry had done ghost writing for Brock in other settings over the years, and then Brock asked him to come to work for him at the Transportation Department. So Terry said yes, to be his assistant secretary for lobbying, which is what his career turned out to be.

JF: Assistant secretary for what?

JG: What do they call it? Government affairs?

JF: Okay.

JG: And Brock brought Terry and another guy from his staff. So anyway, the point is, it’s announced, Terry’s announced that he’s going to go to work, leave the office, have a [unclear] going-away. He goes. In the meantime, a good friend of Mo’s and mine was appointed by Carter to run the old OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity].

JF: OEO?

JG: You’re too young. The War on Poverty. It’s a big agency of community action agencies all over the country—you know, that stuff. So, her name was Graciela [Grace] Olivarez and she was from Phoenix and New Mexico. So she’s back here looking. She was appointed to the cabinet-level job for that [the Community Services Administration]. And she came to visit Mo, didn’t know I was there, [we were reintroduced]. So she asked Mo if—he offered, in fact, that “If you need help, John could help you on your organizational issues as you go to take over this agency.” She said, “Fine!” So they called and they said, “Would you come down and look at our”—these were all Republicans—“look at our staff and how do we remove them and get the Democrats in there?” They were concerned about cleaning house. This is all right around Christmas time or January, somewhere in there.

Anyway, at some point Grace asked Mo would he object if I came down and worked for her? Well, Mo was not happy. He never says no, but he said, “You know,
with Terry gone, John was going to” blah, blah, blah. I found out later—I didn’t know this at the time—that she then came to me directly and asked me if I was interested in the job. And the truth was, I was interested in almost any job after the campaign, if it was interesting. I wasn’t planning to leave, but, you know, make me an offer and we’ll see, because there was a letdown—psychological and emotional letdown—in the office generally, with Terry leaving….

JF: In a way, I’m surprised that Terry left. I mean, he was so loyal. I wonder if it surprised Mo that he left.

JG: Well, they left on good terms, so I don’t know, whatever it was. Maybe it was because it was Brock Adams, who was one of his best congressional friends. I don’t know. I do know that I did not leave on good terms. So Grace asked me if I was interested, and I said, “Yeah, I’m interested.” I’d also gotten an offer of a job at the White House, because of the work I’d done with Hamilton Jordan and Jody Powell. They asked me if I wanted a job working in some staff position in the White House that would grow into something, but they thought I would be a good fit. And I turned them down.

JF: Why?

JG: I think it was probably visceral. I didn’t know that I wanted to go work for Jimmy Carter or something, I don’t know. I was, at the time…. I don’t know, I just was going to stay with Mo, and the other hadn’t even popped up yet. But then this other thing came along, and it was a different offer, because I was going to be running—I’d be the Number Two person in the operation of 4,000-5,000 people in Washington. It was a big bureaucratic organization, had a lot of money, things. I’d never done that kind of work in my life, and I would be in a position of authority, not a Schedule C, work your way up, somewhere. It was an executive presidential appointment, Level 4, so you’ve got to go to the Senate for confirmation.

JF: What department was this under?

JG: It was called the Community Services Administration. So anyway, I said, “Yeah, I’m interested.” So I forget how she handled it, but basically we both went and told Mo that I had decided I wanted to go to work for her. And he was not happy. He told me later that he really, with Terry going, had relied on my staying. And Ella was especially put out by it.

JF: Did they think you were abandoning ship?

JG: Yes, something like that, and that I was going somewhere else, when I should have stayed with him, or I don’t know what. But I left, unceremoniously, on a given day, no goodbyes, no nothing, just….

JF: Really? That must have been hard.
JG: It was, but later on the staff all got together and stuff. But she was adamant that I was not to be congratulated on my change. [unclear]

JF: Was Roger Lewis still there?

JG: Roger had just gone or was just going.

JF: And Dick Olson was gone, Terry was gone, and you left.

JG: That’s when everything changed. The only people left was Prior Pray of the district office in Tucson.

JF: And Lorraine Rogers.

JG: And Lorraine, yes.

JF: That must have been a huge change for him.

JG: Yes, there was nobody there for Mo. I look back on that with—I understand, really, what he was saying. I did not realize ‘til later that I was the institutional memory of the Washington office, and with my leaving, there was none.

JF: Yes. And with all the others gone…. 

JG: What happened was, that he mostly turned to the Interior Committee. He had Stanley Scoville then being elevated. He had Stanley’s friends who he had hired—the people from the Technology Office—all that group of friends of Stan’s that he had recruited over the years. And they did that work that Mo needed on all the Interior stuff as he ascended to the chairmanship.

JF: So he basically just turned his attention there, for the most part.

JG: Yes. It really was sort of the changing of the guard, because there was never any more efforts at any sort of national, other than the garnering of awards. He was just a congressman who chaired a powerful environmental committee.

JF: I understand that in 1985 the subject came up again about the possibility of his running . . .

JG: Well, I wasn’t there, but I’m quite sure that some of those people…. But he had Parkinson’s by then. I saw Mo after I left. It took a couple of years before we were on conversational terms.

JF: How did you like your new job?
JG: Oh, it was a good job, it was fun, everything was different. I ended up testifying before Congress, instead of being the questioner.

JF: What did you testify on?

JG: I managed the budgets of the agency. It was a three- or four-billion-dollar budget. So I was the representative of the agency on the budget, and things like that. It was very bureaucratic, but it was very interesting.

JF: But it was primarily budget?

JG: Yes, it was administrative budget. I was the assistant director for Management and Budget.

JF: How long were you there?

JG: Well, that’s the executive part of my life. About a year into that job, I was contacted by friends of mine at the White House, who said that the president was going to push through the reorganization of the old Office of Education, and make it a cabinet department, make it the Department of Education. That was going to be one of his priorities. And that they wanted me and another guy named Dick Beatty, who was a lawyer from New York who was at the time general counsel to Joe Califano, who at that time was secretary at HEW. They wanted him and me to spearhead a….