

# An Oral History Interview

with

## **TERRY BRACY (part 2)**

*conducted by*  
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The Morris K. Udall Oral History Project  
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[END TAPE 45, SIDE A; BEGIN SIDE B]

JF: Okay, we're on Side B. In 1968, Mo also married Ella Royston. Did you know Ella?

TB: I did. I had gotten to know Ella a little bit socially--particularly the first time I was there as an intern. She was a friend of Louise Greenfield and Jean Jones and ran in what was considered a partying crowd. You know, after Mo was divorced, he was lonesome. So he'd meet people at the Democratic Club and have a drink at night, and Ella was there. I think that's how they really got to know each other.

JF: Was Ella working on Capitol Hill then?

TB: Yes. Ella was a Virginia gal and had grown up in the area, a local gal, and had always had a career as a secretarial-type person on Capitol Hill. And I think when Mo met her, she may have been a staff person on the Post Office and Civil Service Committee. She may have been a professional on that committee when they met, I'm not sure. But I knew Ella, yes.

JF: Had John Gabusi started back there yet?

TB: No.

JF: I was thinking the post office.

TB: No.

JF: I seem to recall Ella did work on the subcommittee itself.

TB: I think that's right. And I think he may have met her that way--don't know.

JF: Do you know how long they dated or courted or whatever before they were married?

TB: No, I really don't. I just know that there was a point at which, during the 1968 campaign, Mo and I were driving somewhere, and he started talking about marrying Ella--which did not come as a huge surprise to me. But what did come as a surprise is he asked me what my opinion of that was, whether I thought he ought to do it or not. I remember the timing pretty well.

JF: And you said?

TB: That will never be recorded.

JF: (laughs) I had to try! Just giving me an idea of timing again, was the CAP still a factor in 1968?

TB: Oh, yes, CAP was ultimately signed into law in 1968, and it was a very big deal, and a

very big win for the state, and all the incumbents were happily reelected, and Mo was never in any trouble anyway, at that point--except that he could have been in trouble because of the stand he took on Vietnam, which I admired. And furthermore, I thought the speech he gave was a great speech.

JF: On Vietnam?

TB: On Vietnam. I thought it was a great, great analysis of the situation.

JF: That was 1967?

TB: He had done that in November of 1967, so he had almost a year to get it out of the way for that election, and it did seem to ebb as an issue, and the Central Arizona Project was approved. I don't remember him having a particularly difficult reelection, but he wanted somebody who understood how to do television, and I had an understanding of how to do that. We were among the first who used it in campaigns, and used it, I think, with reasonable effectiveness in campaigns. And so more and more I did those campaigns.

JF: So television was not a usual form of campaigning in 1968?

TB: It was a developing art. Our stuff was influenced by Charles Guggenheim, I'd say, with Charlie Guggenheim as the main influence on me, and how he sort of used film to bring out the personality of the people. And Mo was an easy product to sell. So we did some stuff now which would look probably pretty fossilized, but at the time was hard to beat. It won national awards. We did it with local people here. I wrote scripts and imagined what was going to be done.

JF: I remember those.

TB: You were in one or more of them! They were good, weren't they?

JF: Yes, I thought they were brilliant! (laughs) Going back to 1967 and the Vietnam War speech, did Mo write that himself? Were you involved in writing it?

TB: No, I was not. Mo wrote that with Dick Olson. It was strictly the Mo Udall-Dick Olson team on that one.

JF: Do you recall when he decided to go that route? Did he discuss that with you at all?

TB: Well, I could tell in his private conversation where his head was on the subject, long before November of that year. I mean, it was clear to me that Mo was moving. As soon as I started doing work for him in 1966, it was pretty clear to me that he was growing extremely skeptical of this war, and the policies, and all these kind of "best and brightest" advisors, who were, he thought, giving some pretty lousy advice to Johnson. And you could just see it coming.

JF: Did you have any feel for--with Stewart being in the cabinet at that time, and Johnson not being one to take disaffection very well, was that something that concerned Mo?

TB: You know, I should have asked Stewart about that today. I'm sorry I didn't. John Gabusi reminded me of it. Damn it! I wish I'd thought of it! You know, what went on was sort of a conspiracy between the brothers. When the White House got wind of what Mo was about to do, I think they contacted any number of people, but I know the secretary of state called Mo, and maybe the secretary of defense, ahead of time. I remember what Stewart's private advice to Mo was--Stewart didn't want to be in the middle of it--"Just do it and don't tell me about it."

JF: So the word had gotten out that he was going to do this speech?

TB: Yes, but they held it tight. But the word had.... A few days ahead of time, Mo let some people know. He did the classy thing. He sent a copy of it to the president, "I'm going to give this speech. I want you to know about it." So that's when all the calls started. But that's a great one to ask Stew about.

JF: In 1970, Mo ran for majority leader against Hale Boggs. Were you involved in that at all?

TB: Yes, I was more deeply involved in that, as was John Gabusi.

JF: When did John come in?

TB: John had come in maybe the year before--but I, more than John, maybe on that. Mo, by that point, was making far greater use of me, and we had drawn a lot closer. He liked to talk to me about things, and so I became very involved, but by that point I was kind of very involved in everything he was doing. And actually, one of my great regrets about that is it created a tension between me and Dick Olson.

JF: Was he using you more and Dick less, or just you more?

TB: Well, I remember one thing that happened was that Mo decided that he wanted me to do the campaign, and he didn't want Dick to do it, he wanted me to do it.

JF: That was 1968?

TB: I believe it was--maybe it was 1970--but through that period of time. I think maybe that was 1970. It was not good. It was one of those things. But Mo and Dick continued to have conflicts, and particularly Dick just--when Mo married Ella, Dick was just so disapproving of that. So anyway, before long, Dick was gone and I had picked up all of his stuff in addition to what I did myself, and I sort of at that point became Mo's back-up writer. I don't know, you saw my job.

JF: Was the 1970 campaign the first campaign that you did?

TB: I think that's right. Now, when we say "I did it," keep in mind that my role in it was to deal with the writing, the creative side, the press, the television, the strategy; but John Gabusi ran the day-to-day campaign. John, I think, has always been a superior administrator--certainly superior to me--and very talented. So John and I worked as a team. That propelled itself into the 1975-76 campaign for president.

JF: Was Ella Udall at that time campaigning with Mo in the Tucson area?

TB: Mo brought her in and introduced her slowly, and she became more and more a presence here.

JF: Did you schedule them together then?

TB: Ella could do her own schedule. It was a different era.

JF: Did she campaign actually?

TB: Well, yes, she'd go to parties. She enjoyed herself. She liked Tucson, she'd come out here and sit in the sun.

JF: Nowadays, I guess more wives are actively involved in the campaigns.

TB: Well, it's a different world. It's completely different.

JF: In 1971, I think it was, Mo became very much involved in the Campaign Finance Reform Bill.

TB: Exactly.

JF: As I recall, you had a lot to do with that as well.

TB: Yes, I did, Julie. It was a great experience. In 1971, Mo decided to try to move ahead on campaign finance reform. Common Cause had been organized to support this kind of effort, and John Gardner headed Common Cause. There seemed to be steam for it on the editorial pages of the important newspapers of the country. So Mo thought it was the time to do it, but it had to be bipartisan, and so Mo solicited the partnership of John Anderson of Illinois, who was then the head of the Republican Conference, the third leadership position in the House, who was a moderate from Illinois, and a natural ally in other things as well. They produced what was called the Anderson-Udall Bill, done alphabetically. The two staff people assigned to do the work were for Mo Udall, me, Terry Bracy, and for John Anderson, a young guy named David Stockman. Dave, of course, went on to have a fantastic political, and now financial, career. But Dave and I worked very closely in cooking up the contents of that bill, and what might sell, and what might not. In fact, later, the two of us, working together with, of course, some outside idea people, came up with the notion of matching funds in presidential races.

JF: That was an original?

TB: That was an original, yes. And it came out of the Anderson-Udall effort. Of course, it was not completely innocent--on my part, at least--because if you ever had any dreams of the presidency, and you didn't have any money, matching funds were one way to go.

JF: So as far back as what, 1970, 1971, you were thinking of a presidential race?

TB: Yes.

JF: With Mo?

TB: Probably, really, yes. And it really matured in 1972 when some friends of mine led this--although Mo was for Muskie and John and I ran the Muskie effort--you helped here--and we eked it out, and early-on in Arizona. But Muskie went down the tubes and McGovern won. The war was the issue and, God, I thought the world had passed me by. I was twenty-nine years old, I think. And here was Gary Hart. A guy I knew very well, on the cover of *Time* magazine. And Rick Sterns, another guy I knew very well and liked, he was the evil genius of the McGovern.... And I thought, "Where am I in all of this?" Well, the answer was, I was asked to be the western coordinator during the general election for the Democratic Party. So I had all the states, except California.

JF: And this was 1972?

TB: 1972, in the general election. And of course we were destined to lose every single one of them--along with everything else except Massachusetts. But it provided me an invaluable experience in seeing how it was done: how states were organized, what the infighting was like, how you did it. And I had many experiences during that few months. But of course I immediately hired my sidekick, Gabusi, to be my partner in this, and told Mo I was going to do this, and Mo conspired with us. He had an easy reelection, and he was quite happy to have us go off and learn how this is done--which is exactly what we did.

JF: If you had to put a time on when you thought the seeds of running for president were in his mind, when would you say?

TB: Well, I think latently they were always there. I think having a young eager beaver like me, who kind of worshipped him, but who was also real smart and had gained a lot of useful experience, was one of the things that pushed him. I mean, you had to think about how you launch it and how you do all this and all that. We did it pretty cleverly.

JF: Did you or Mo, or both of you, consult Stewart at some point in time?

TB: Both of us did. That's probably the era when I got to know Stewart quite well.

JF: When would that have been, about?

TB: Well, I'd always known Stewart a little bit, but I really got to know him when Mo ran for president. In fact, I suggested that Mo make Stewart his campaign chairman, because there was so much infighting going on, and I could just see it coming. I thought, only if he had a brother next to him, you know, would he have someone who was unassailable, ultimately. So he did that.

JF: What was his reaction initially when you and Mo, or one of you or both of you, approached Stewart about Mo's ambitions, or about the possibility of running for president?

TB: Loved it. Scared him a little bit, but he loved it. Thought it was audacious.

JF: I think that's the word that he had used most to describe Mo: audacious.

TB: Mo just did it. He's just the most amazing guy. I've had some commentary--which of course I love--about the way I've sort of taken the Foundation, and how aggressive.... I learned from Mo. I mean, I learned that you can take a very small thing and make it into a very big thing, if you've got the right motives and the right intention, and can get the smartest people you can around you. And this Foundation is going to be a huge success, Julie. I mean, it really is.

JF: I don't doubt that at all.

TB: I mean, look what we're doing already! So this is all learned from Mo, this is where I got my basic instruction in life survival.

JF: What did you all do when you first decided "It 's a go, we're gonna go for president"? I assume mostly you and John Gabusi and Mo at that point. What did you do at the beginning?

TB: Well, you went to New Hampshire, to show you were for real, and just started working New Hampshire.

JF: What about the letter from the congressmen? How did all that get started?

TB: Oh, oh, that. Well, yes, I can't really remember whether I cooked that idea up, or Mo did. But I remember Mo's mantra, "I wouldn't do this unless at least fifty members of the House asked me to do it."

JF: Was that a concern partly because traditionally people had not run for the presidency from the House?

TB: Yes, it was considered crazy. But there has always been this wonderful tension between the House and the Senate. You know, it's not the party, it's the Senate that's the real enemy, right? And the idea that any senator not under indictment considered themselves a presidential candidate--and some under indictment did—and that no House member could

be thought of in a serious way. So Mo became the poster child for that movement. I don't know if it was fifty or fifty-five or sixty, signatures of very significant people who basically said, "Go ahead, Mo! We're for ya!" led by Dave Obey and a bunch of the young then-Turks.

JF: Do you think they thought he had a chance at that point, or was this a symbolic run that they were encouraging him to do?

TB: Well, I don't know how they rated his chances--probably not as great--but they sure liked the idea that a guy of his quality was going to go out there and represent the House of Representatives in this deal, and therefore maybe elevate their own prestige and the prestige of the House. So I think there was a lot of that feeling in it. And of course he did just that.

JF: Do you recall who authored the letter the Congressmen signed?

TB: You know, I can't say the final. I know I was involved in drafts of it.

JF: Now, Dick Olson was no longer there?

TB: I don't remember exactly when Dick left, but yes, I think Dick was gone and working at the Wilderness Society at that point. (tape paused for break)

JF: Okay, we're "back on the air" as it were. Before you left, you mentioned something about your role in the campaign. My sense of it is that you were basically the strategist. Would that be fair?

TB: Yes, I think that's probably.... I went through moments when I fell in and out of favor, but largely, Mo depended upon me to sort of be his political strategist and to think this through: how to get the best result out of his effort, and [first of all (Tr.)] try to win. If you can't win, how do you come out of it a bigger, better, more powerful figure? So my kind of role with him may have come in conflict to some extent with my role in the campaign, because it was larger. You know, I was going to be there whether he won or lost. And we knew that this was a long shot, and his first shot. And so my perspective was a more long-term perspective about him, than the people, Jack Quinn and others, who came in just for the purpose of running the campaign, and the tension for them was to run the campaign, win the campaign, life was over--or their Udall life was over after that campaign. In my case, I felt I had wider responsibilities, and I'm sure that's what Mo wanted.

JF: You were still on the Congressional staff at that point.

TB: Mo wanted me to stay on the congressional staff. He did not want me to go to the campaign. And I traveled with him--the two of us traveled together in his first run around the country--just the two of us. So I played a lot of different roles with him. John Gabusi, again, was going to do the logistics, be the, quote, "campaign manager." And John did that initially, but then because of some family problems that erupted out of nowhere, John all of a sudden had to leave the campaign. And we were left a month from Iowa looking for a

new campaign manager. And there was a lot of disruption at that point.

JF: Was the original intent that John would be manager of the campaign throughout?

TB: Yes. Sort of the game plan was that I'd get this thing started, I'd get the basic organization started in New Hampshire, I'd do the press, I'd get Mo postured, I'd do that part--and I did it--and travel with Mo. And then as it got into time for the campaign, John would gradually take over, and I would then just probably be with Mo, or be the head writer or whatever it was. And the problem is, we got to sort of that transition point, and all of a sudden John wasn't there, and so you had to hand over--and I never did it very well--all your hopes and dreams and aspirations and history of this effort to someone you never met before, really.

JF: Who was that?

TB: It was Jack Quinn, who turned out to be a very successful, capable, Washington lawyer, who served as chief of staff to the vice-president, who served as a White House counsel--a very smart, able, tough character. But I never could quite.... And then certain things happened, that intervened. For example, Mo's health started going south.

JF: When did you first start noticing that?

TB: In 1974 . We were here in Phoenix for a fund-raiser, and Mo had been complaining and feeling bad all day, but we went through it. It was at the Adams Hotel in Phoenix, and we had a fund-raiser, and it was a nice fund-raiser, turned out well. Mo and I were upstairs, and I think sharing a suite. But anyway, "bang, bang, bang" on my door in the middle of the night, and Mo said, "Terry, you gotta get me a cab. We gotta get to the hospital." He was all crouched over, and he was having chest pains. I thought he was having a heart attack, and I think he did too. He felt awful. So I got some clothes on him, and he limped downstairs, and I said, "Mo, we really ought to get an ambulance." "Nah, don't want an ambulance." So there I am at 2:00 a.m. outside the Adams Hotel, looking for a cab in Phoenix. They don't exist. So finally, I think it was a guy from the hotel, I got a security guy or something to give us a ride to Good Samaritan Hospital. So he was in Good Sam for most of a week, or more than a week maybe--at least a week, I'd say. And what they finally diagnosed was a case of pneumonia, bad case of pneumonia. But you can mark on any chart you wish the decline of his health from that day forward. He was never able, after that, to really work a full day on the campaign trail. Of course he didn't want other people to know that. It happened to be something I knew, and I would intervene time and time again, unhappily with the campaign, and chop his schedule. He had to rest in the afternoon, he couldn't make it, he had to rest. Well, anyway, that episode was the beginning of Parkinson's.

JF: That was in 1974. He announced in 1974, didn't he? later, like November I want to say.

TB: That he had Parkinson's?

JF: No, he announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination in 1974.

TB: Well, this may have been 1975, because he had already announced. And we decided--I decided, and he went along with it--that the way to announce was to do it in New Hampshire, before anybody else did it. And that's how we got all the evening news and got a big lift-off, that you wouldn't have had if you were a ho-hum House member or something. So that was a tension in the campaign.

JF: The incident you were talking about, though, was after he announced?

TB: After he announced.

JF: Several months?

TB: Yes, it was after he announced. But in any event, there was the health issue that created some tension. That kind of stuff. So my role in the campaign was really more an extension of my role in his life. I've never exactly found the name for it.

JF: Backing up just a little bit: When Mo announced, he announced two years in advance, which was the longest that anybody had announced campaign at that point. Now it's becoming fairly standard. Mo was quite an advocate of controlled campaign finance and things like that. Did he see any friction between the idea of length of campaigns and campaign finance reform?

TB: Certainly not then. He was off and he was launched, and that was that. I pushed him out there as far as I could get him.

JF: When Jack Quinn took over as campaign manager, was Mo already, to you, showing signs of physical problems? Had that occurred before or after Jack took over from John?

TB: It had happened before, I believe. I don't know those dates exactly, but Jack was trying to run a campaign, and he had no clue about anything personal having to do with Mo, that I know of. And I don't know, there was something about Jack that was off-putting to me, but beyond that, it was a troubling time, because it was hard to vest in someone new like this, all the authority. So I had a hard time with it. I didn't handle it well.

JF: And you and John had been so close up until then.

TB: John and I, yes, very close. We had worked together for years. So Jack and I didn't click, and it all got very petty and all that--for a while. Actually, I missed some of the best days of the campaign because of that. I stayed away in New Hampshire, although I'd organized New Hampshire. The night of the New Hampshire primary I was actually at my home, with Nancy, in McLean, Virginia--I didn't go up there. That's how tense the situation was. I remember Mo calling me with the early returns.

The other thing about my relationship with Mo was that we were real close, and it

did cause jealousy among others who wished to be very close to him. And in some ways I was in the way. You know, you see this replayed. Shakespeare's shown it. You see it replayed all the time. I was in that scenario for some period of time, and it was not a particularly happy period professionally for me.

JF: Very awkward, it sounds like.

TB: It was very awkward.

JF: How about other key players on the campaign: scheduler Ron Pettine, and Ed Coyle?

TB: Ron was a very able scheduler. You know, he seemed to know exactly what he was doing. He was okay.

JF: How was his relationship with Mo?

TB: Oh, a scheduler's relationship is never very good with anybody. It's a terrible job. Your job is to control things and say no to most everybody. And of course the first person that hates you is the candidate's spouse. But I thought Ron did a good job.

JF: Speaking of candidate spouse: How was Ella dealing with the idea of Mo running for president? In the early stages, was she in favor of the idea?

TB: In the early stages, it scared her. But she caught the magic.

JF: She got into it?

TB: Yes, she got into it.

JF: Did she enjoy the campaign?

TB: Yes, I think she did--I really do. I think she had a heck of a time.

JF: Ed Coyle. What was his position in the campaign?

TB: Ed was a guy that John had hired. I don't remember exactly what Ed was. He had some significant organizational role in the campaign, although I've never figured out exactly what it was.

JF: How was his relationship with Mo?

TB: It was generally good, I think. And it was good for quite a number of years, until Mo really got put off with the way Ed was spending money with Independent Action. It was good for a while.

JF: When in the campaigns and caucuses did Jack Quinn take over?

TB: It strikes me as pre-Iowa, right before Iowa, a couple of months before Iowa. Of course I didn't know what I didn't know. But Iowa looked to me like a waste of money and time. I thought we could win New Hampshire, and there was a lot of evidence that we could. We had a wonderful organization put together there, led by Maria Carrier, remember? And we had a real chance to win New Hampshire. Merv Westin and that whole crowd--wonderful group. But of course Carter got hot early in Iowa, and maybe if Mo weren't in Iowa and Carter had gotten hot, it would have hurt Mo equally. But the fact that Mo went to Iowa late- finished fourth, was it?

JF: Fourth, I believe.

TB: You know, finished badly, a week before New Hampshire, or two weeks before New Hampshire, was that increment of momentum that was taken away from us that caused Mo to be second, not first, in New Hampshire. So I had a big investment in the New Hampshire campaign, and I summoned every silly argument I could to say "stay out of Iowa and focus on New Hampshire." So I guess it gives me an "I told you so," but it doesn't add up to much. They're all a guess, you don't know what to do.

JF: How about Florida? Was there any feeling later that staying out of Florida was a mistake?

TB: Well, Sergio Bendixon, who was a young Hispanic organizer in Florida, and a good one, went on to some fame in the game, and some others approached us about getting in the Florida primary. Of course we were trying to figure out what to do, and we were tempted and so on, but it was clear when you looked at it that the effect of Mo getting into the Florida primary would almost certainly mean that George Wallace would win. So on the one hand, you really didn't want Jimmy Carter to win, because you wanted to beat Carter. On the other hand, you really didn't want George Wallace to win, and which one didn't you want the most?

JF: At the time the decision was made on Florida, was Jimmy Carter much of a factor?

TB: Jimmy Carter was becoming a factor. These decisions were all starting to become--I mean, to those of us who were at the ground level in the campaign, we saw Carter, and we saw how he was organized, and Carter was certainly a factor, because we figured that Carter's strength would be in the South, as a southern governor. Carter would have a real chance to win Florida.

JF: And yet the only one--none of the liberals really challenged Carter in the South, did they?

TB: Well, I don't know. I'd have to see who ended up on the ballot in Florida. I think they all intended to go there--Bayh and all the rest of them--big state, although not the Florida is today. But I think what Mo decided was that--and it was probably a tactical mistake. I mean, from a tactical perspective, he clearly should have gotten in it, but from a strategic

perspective, he didn't want George Wallace to get one inch further in life, and so he stayed out, because he didn't want that result.

JF: Before Iowa results were in, once all the candidates had announced and there was quite a field of competing liberals, who did you and Mo think was the primary opposition?

TB: Well, it kind of looked like Scoop Jackson. He had a big war chest. He was obviously a very capable, honorable senator. He had some big, big interests behind him. He was a favorite of the Jewish community. He just looked, early on, like he might be the real competition.

JF: How about among the liberals? The many liberals.

TB: Probably Bayh. I mean, Birch Bayh was a very famous liberal senator, well-known, had worked the national press, and to some extent the early primary states for many years. I think we saw Bayh probably as the most viable. Although you never knew if there was still Kennedy magic, and Sargent Shriver would take off.

JF: How about Fred Harris?

TB: Never took him seriously. The issue is privilege. "The ish-ah is privilege." And the third time you saw that speech, you just realized that he wasn't a serious man anymore. You know, he just wasn't serious. He was off becoming a populist figure. You knew he wasn't going to win. But the problem is, you get so many bites out of your hide from people who might think about voting for you. He didn't help.

JF: In Wisconsin, in particular. By New Hampshire he was pretty well out of the race, by his own admission. By Massachusetts, he knew he was out of the race for sure, if there'd been any doubt before that, yet he stayed in the race in Wisconsin, which had pretty much come down to a race between Carter and Mo. By that time, Mo had come in second in a series, and the others were pretty well getting eliminated at that point. Wisconsin was a key state. Harris was somebody, you all, as I understood it, were pretty concerned was going to draw votes away from Mo. Did anybody ever approach him or his campaign and ask him to step aside under the circumstances, do you recall?

TB: I don't know. I didn't. As the Wisconsin campaign was going on, I was out of power for a few weeks, and John Martilla had taken over, and it was his moment in the sun. And then actually, during the Wisconsin primary, Mo had me go to New York City and raise some money for his media budget there, which is a job I did. I actually went up and got Bill Bradley to help. He was playing for the Nicks, and Bradley met me--I called him, he met me right away, had a thousand-dollar check in his hand and said, "Who can I call?" He was great.

JF: Long before he ran for office.

TB: That's right. He was in his last year with the Nicks.

JF: How did Martilla and Kiley get involved in the campaign? How did that come about?

TB: I think through Jack Quinn. They were pretty capable guys, really. I thought they were pretty capable.

JF: So they were brought in....

TB: Late in the Massachusetts campaign, I think, is when they came in, and they stuck.

JF: They were really the only hired consultants....

TB: Well, we started with a guy named Johnny Alum [phonetic spelling]. He was Jack Quinn's selection. I thought he was just pathetic. I thought the TV was just awful. Of course I was meddling in the television, and probably what I should have done is I should have gotten outside the campaign and just done his television. But I couldn't. My role with Mo was different than that.

JF: Did that ever come up as a possibility, of you doing that?

TB: Yes.

JF: Why didn't it happen?

TB: Just because I was doing so many other things.

JF: Probably needed you where you were.

TB: It's just that whatever my job was, it wasn't a job that's easily filled by someone. And he just always kind of ultimately wanted me there. And I'm not sure what I wanted. I mean, I just....

[END TAPE 45, SIDE B; BEGIN TAPE 46, SIDE A]