JF: This is another in a series of oral histories that form the Morris K. Udall Oral History Project. I'm Julie Ferdon, it's Monday, March 8, [1999], and we're in the office of Robert Anthony Neuman, at Neuman and Company, 1317 "S" Street, Northwest, in Washington, D.C.

Bob, thank you very much for participating in this project. I want to just start out with a little bit of background information. You were born on August 4, 1939?

RN: Correct.

JF: In Oakland?

RN: In Oakland, California.

JF: And went to San Jose University?

RN: San Jose State, then College, now University.

JF: What was your major in?

RN: Journalism, public affairs. Actually, it was kind of a public relations, journalism, advertising mixture. It's an A.B. in something. I guess now they would call it communications.

JF: What did you do after college?

RN: I went and worked for some small newspapers, and had one brief stint in fund-raising with what was then called the Radio Free Europe Fund, which I later learned was a CIA front. My friends and teachers couldn't understand why, in going for a seemingly innocuous job with raising money for Radio Free Europe that they had to undergo all kinds of FBI field checks and this and that. I should have been tipped off that it was a CIA front then.

But I worked for a couple of papers in the San Jose-Oakland area, and I came back to Washington in 1968 with then Congressman Jerome Waldie of Antioch, California. I had covered him as a political writer and a city editor for the major newspaper in the district, The Contra Costa Times. And so I came back in December of 1968 and I worked for him for about five years, and I went to work for Mo in November of 1974.

JF: How was it that you first got acquainted with Mo?

RN: The first time I actually met him was out at Dulles [Airport], where I had taken Waldie out to make a plane for California, and we got there a little early and sat down and had a beer, and there was Mo walking up, so Jerry invited him over. This was probably 1969 or 1970, and I think he had just taken on the Speaker--1970 it probably was. And Mo sat down and [Waldie] said, "This is one of the bravest men in all of Washington. He not only has taken on the congressional leadership, but he is calling for population restraints and has six children." And Mo laughed and we became acquainted there. Mo served on the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, as did Jerry. It seemed to be a place where they would put renegades. I met John
Gabusi and Terry Bracy and some others of Mo staff—Dee Jackson, Bonnie Kell. At that time, staffs were smaller and everybody was a little cozier. When we had joint projects together, the staffs would work pretty closely together. So I met them and liked them all very much—especially John. He and I got along famously.

JF: John Gabusi?

RN: Yes. And it led to when they were considering the run for president and [David] Obey and Henry Reuss were circulating petitions, they invited some staff people that they knew to come to a meeting—I think it was May or June of 1974—and I went along and they made a pitch about a man from the House running for the presidency. I was frankly very skeptical of it, although I liked and admired Mo. They invited me back to a couple more meetings, and we sat down and I wrote some memos as press strategies and things like that. When my tiger, Waldie, decided to leave the Congress, Terry and John asked if I would consider coming to work with Mo as a press secretary, and as press secretary work on the formative part of what was to be a presidential campaign. I jumped at the chance.

JF: Were you hired then as press secretary for the congressional office?

RN: I was, yes.

JF: Not for the campaign?

RN: No, there was nobody hired yet for the campaign. I think laws were a little more liberal there. You could do—but it was on your own time—you could do some campaign work. And they would detail people off onto campaign payrolls, so they could do work there. Things were a little more relaxed then.

JF: Did you also do speech writing?

RN: When I came on board with Mo, the first project I had was not an easy one. It was to work on a statement and issue paper on the issue of busing, which was controversial in Tucson at the time. This was, I think, before the 1974 election. I was doing a little moonlighting for him while still working for Waldi, who I worked for through November of 1974. So that was my first project. It was interesting. I worked for the first time with Roger Lewis, and was very fond of him and his practical, common sense approach to issues, and found him in contrast to Bracy and Gabusi who were kind of more aggressive, on the cutting edge, politically; and Roger was kind of a restraining figure.

JF: By November of 1974, Mo had announced for the candidacy for the presidency. How did he manage to keep up with his congressional duties during the time he was campaigning?

RN: It was very, very tiring. When I first went to work for him, I guess they had planned the kickoff that was in New York and New Hampshire. And the whole point was to try to get on the front page of The New York Times, in order to get some credibility. At this time, Mo was the,
quote, "liberal front runner," unquote. The first time I actually interviewed him directly about going to work for him was like in September or October, and we interrupted our interview to watch on television as Ted Kennedy withdrew from the race. The next time I talked to him about a serious offer to be made to me, we interrupted to watch Mondale drop out. So Mo considered me to be good luck.

JF:  (chuckles) Didn't help much with Bayh and Harris, though, did it?

RN:  So how he kept apace with his....  Although we were straying off between speech writing, and then I got into this. I did do some speech writing, but he had a stable of speech writers who were very, very good, and they included Nix and Jessica....

JF:  David Nix?

RN:  Yes. And Jessica Tuckman [Matthews]. And Bracy did speech writing as well. What I would do would be to condense the speeches, the drafts that were coming in, do a little editing and condense them into a press release and issue papers--one-pagers--things like that, that were on issues that transcended congressional and political business, really.

To go back to your question about how he was able to do congressional work at the same time he was campaigning, the early effort required quite a bit of travel to do the seminal fund-raising. We had to comply with the new law at the time, which required raising at least $5,000 in small donations in twenty states before you could qualify for matching funds. So the strategy was to go out and do that, which required quite a bit of travel. Mo would take these god-awful flights in small planes and charters and scheduled airlines that would require him to go to New York and to Kansas and to North Carolina and Michigan and Wisconsin, and then come back in time for business, for committee hearings and the votes. It was extraordinarily tiring on him. You could see from the start that this was going to take a lot of stamina and a lot of good luck to bear any fruit at all.

JF:  Did he miss a lot of votes during that time?

RN:  Not really. No, I mean, he was really careful. The House had a pretty relaxed schedule that only votes really occurred on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays. Mondays and Fridays generally were business that did not require voting. So that would give him some flexibility.

JF:  A long weekend. How would you sum up how the press felt about Mo as a legislator and as a campaigner at that point in time, in, say, 1974?

RN:  Well, he had safely acquired a rare niche--well, not that rare, but somewhat rare. The Washington press corps really did admire him, both for his wit and for his ability. Sometimes you'll get the press to admire you for one or the other, but it's rare that you get both, and he managed to do that. I think that people had seen his courage and innovation in his legislative record, and his willingness to take on the powers that be for a leadership post that he didn't win, but that he took on as a reformer and as a liberal. And being a liberal from Arizona was also
somewhat remarkable. Being a one-eyed Mormon liberal from Arizona was even more so. And the fact that he could joke readily, and that he returned his phone calls, and did all the rudimentary things that established good press relations. He didn't whine when he got an occasional bad story, though. Sometimes he needed to be restrained from that. (JF chuckles)

My recollection is that the first time that Mo met with all the first-ranked, class "A" political writers was at an institution in Washington called the Sperling Breakfast. Godfrey Sperling was the bureau chief of The Christian Science Monitor, and held a breakfast twice a week in which notables would come and face the horrible breakfast--runny eggs and cold bacon--and about twenty to twenty-five really "A" tier political press--bureau chiefs and columnists and what have you. Mo was invited for the first time. We did some preparation. I gave him a list of who was there, and a short thumbnail description afterwards--what they did and what they liked and who they didn't like, and there were conservative and Republican-based guys there like Novak and what have you. But Mo went there--it was really funny--he was introduced and made his opening perfunctory remarks, and what he was doing and why he was doing it. And John Pierson of The Wall Street Journal said, "Mr. Udall, you're known as a man of great intelligence and great wit, with an enviable legislative record. My question is this: Are you prick enough to be president?" We all laughed and Mo laughed, and then responded with a couple of "the cactus and caucus" and the "white stallion" stories. So he had a joke for every occasion, which was one of the reasons the press just loved him.

JF: Which is the white stallion?

RN: The political figure is invited to the Indian reservation to give a speech during a campaign, and he gives a great speech about how much he'll promise the Indians and this and that. And then he was offered a horse from the stable. And he and the chief of the tribe rode down the main street of the reservation to great applause from all the Indians who were watching. The chief said to the politician, "Well, you can keep this nice mare as a token of our esteem and good wishes." And the politician said, "Mr. Chairman, I think you must be mistaken. I think this horse is a stallion." And the chief said, "No, no, no, this horse is a mare." "Well, I distinctly heard somebody say, 'Look at the big prick on that white horse,' as we were coming down the road."

JF: (laughs) I had forgotten that one.

RN: I must say, too, that out of sensitivity, that Mo would not tell a story like that in the presence of women, and at that time the Sperling Breakfast did not have any women in it.

JF: Let's talk some specifically about the 1976 campaign. The first real test was Iowa, even though up to then the first real test had been New Hampshire, Iowa Caucuses preceded that in 1976. There was a fair amount of debate in Mo's headquarters or office regarding whether he should even compete in Iowa. I guess Gabusi, I believe, was one who thought that Iowa would not really be the first test, and Jack Quinn was arguing that it would be. Do you remember any of that discussion?
RN: Yes. Even before Jack Quinn, Ken Bode was on the staff. Ken Bode was from Iowa, was a veteran of the McGovern effort, as were a number of other people, who looked at the McGovern model of 1972 as being the one that we should take, in that it was the road to credibility, and absent that, that you would be in the dark for the weeks prior to the New Hampshire Primary, and that no one would pay any attention to you. On the other side were those who argued that we didn't have the resources, and Mo didn't have the time, to effectively campaign in both places, and that chances were that we could do one or the other, but not both, or we would lose both. It was a difficult, difficult decision, and there was compelling reasoning on both sides. So Mo did the usual Mo thing, and he tried to compromise and do both. He promised the people in Iowa that he would make every effort and he would put as much resources as he had, into that. At the same time, he told the people in New Hampshire that if he didn't score and participate in the Iowa Caucuses, that he wouldn't survive enough to be a credible candidate in New Hampshire. Although a lot of people didn't agree with that, they understood his reasoning. It caused a rift in the campaign.

JF: From the outset?

RN: Yes, and it led to the campaign-manager-of-the-week phenomenon that happened after that.

JF: Did you go to Iowa?

RN: I did.

JF: In what capacity, as a press person?

RN: You know, come to think of it, I went to Iowa, but not in 1974. No, I did not go in 1976. Dick Stout was on the campaign staff, and traveled with Mo as the press secretary on the campaign.

JF: In Iowa?

RN: Yes.

JF: Do you remember who covered Mo from the national press then in Iowa?

RN: (pause) Linda Charelton [phonetic spelling] of The New York Times was assigned to us. We had a number of people from The [Washington] Post. Bill Peterson I remember, from The Post. Both of those people are now dead. Charlie Moore of The New York Times was also sent by The New York Times to cover us. He's also dead. We saw [David] Broder all the time, and he was kind of stationed out there. Bill Peterson kind of was The Post guy who was with us. And we saw, of course, all the regulars from the other papers, Curtis Wilkie, Boston Globe; Jon Margolis of the Chicago Tribune; Bob Shogun, L.A. Times was a regular with us. And then we had the network crews. We had Bill Plant, who at that time was stationed in Chicago for CBS, and he came with us. ABC, we had Good Morning America, Charlie.... Can't think of his name right now--it'll come to me. [Gibson] He was ABC. NBC, we had Chuck Quinn.
JF: That's right. In Iowa, Mo came in, I believe it was fourth or something. (RN: Yes.) Was that a great disappointment for him? And how did you deal with that from a press standpoint?

RN: It was a disappointment. I think we had hoped to do better than that. I think it was a foregone conclusion that Carter would win, but we thought that if we came in a reasonable second, that would give us some momentum, but everyone knew that Carter was going to get a blitz out of this that would be real tough to beat. As it turned out, when Mo came in fourth, we had no bounce at all. We had to fend off these negative reports that Mo would scrap the campaign. A lot of them came out of Arizona--naysayers out there.

JF: That was sort of a problem throughout the campaign—the “you're never a prophet in your own home” mentality

RN: Well, also, I think there were competing political forces in Arizona. The DeConcini people were worried that Mo would give up early and then run for the Senate out there. And meanwhile, it was hard to raise money, and you couldn't blame them for being somewhat resentful, when Mo was out there tapping every nickel he could get out of Arizona. And there were Mo's supporters in Arizona who were skeptical of this whole thing who were urging him to run for the Senate. Meanwhile, Mo was looking down and seeing, "God, I don't know if I want to run for the Senate. I don't want to think about anything except running for the nomination." It was tough on him, the home state not being solidly in his backing.

JF: New Hampshire was the next big test. Did you travel with Mo there?

RN: I Did you go to New Hampshire. A crew of us went up, I think, like the Friday before the New Hampshire Primary, on our own time, on vacation time or what have you, and just piled in the cars, went up there to do the last four days of leafletting and walking precincts and doing whatever we could do on his behalf. It was a great adventure.

JF: So you were doing door-to-door canvassing as well?

RN: Yes, I worked with Dick Stout at the headquarters hotel, and went with Mo on a couple of his last plant gates and other things that were going on up there. It was interesting.

JF: Where was his headquarters?

RN: It was at the Holiday Inn (chuckles) naturally enough, in Manchester.

JF: So the key press person was still Dick Stout?

RN: Dick was the road press guy, and I would be kind of the person in Washington that would do the congressional business, and then on my own time go over and work in the campaign office in the evenings.
JF: Was the same press crew following you at that time as in Iowa?

RN: Yes, we had pretty much a regular following.

JF: What was the greatest challenge from a press point of view in New Hampshire?

RN: Keeping the credibility up, keeping the negative stories at bay. Every time we'd turn around, it was "this probably is the last day before Udall's last stand," and "insiders are expecting that if he doesn't do well here, he'll withdraw." And we had to fight that all of the time. We had to fight that all the way down to the end.

JF: Where were those coming from?

RN: Sometimes just colleagues who were well-intentioned and worried about him. Sometimes within the campaign from people who were dejected, and after a couple of losses lost heart. And a lot of it came from his opponents.

JF: Would you give us your impression of some of the major press figures then? Like Johnny Apple, wasn't he....

RN: Apple was critical to the whole outcome of the 1976 race. In October of 1975 there was a straw poll exercise put together by the Des Moines Register and Iowa State and the Iowa Democratic Party. And in order to qualify to cast a straw vote, you had to buy a dinner ticket and come to this quasi-convention and cattle show, is what it was, at Iowa State in a big basketball arena. And the Carter people, who had done their grass roots organizing for over a year, were really prepared for that. They had buses, they had people lined up. They paid the way for students and what have you, and they really packed the room. Mo gave unquestionably the best speech there, but we had all the players from Milton Shapp to Fred Harris to Henry Jackson. I think everybody was there except Wallace. And Mo gave a great speech, but we just didn't have the troops there. What it demonstrated to Apple and the other journalists present was that Carter in fact had that kind of grass roots strength that he could put together in the caucuses in early 1976, and was going to win it big. So he had a page-winning story after the straw poll, which indicated that Carter was way ahead. And that helped Carter a great deal in his fund-raising, and it put a crimp in our efforts, because it further cast doubts as to Mo's ability to carry it off.

JF: I spoke to David Broder the other day, and he indicated that--at least my impression was--that Johnny Apple almost single-handedly made Iowa into the major test.

RN: Well, there's another guy by the name of Jim Flansberg who was the political editor of The Morning Register, and that was really his baby. I saw Apple at the straw poll and I made kind of a joking reference to "Flansberg's folly," that this thing really didn't have much meaning. And then he corrected me. He said no, this had a lot of meaning. And I knew right then that Apple was clearly in the Iowa Caucus strategy. So it was no surprise to me.
JF: How about David Broder?

RN: Broder was, I think, a little more distant from that, although he gave the outcome there, and no one could doubt that Carter had showed great determination and an excellent grass roots strategy. And I think that--well, there might have been a lot of skeptics about this guy, "Who is this guy?" kind of thing. David, early on, recognized, I think, that he had some appeal and that his message was being heard, and that he seemed to be able to not anger anybody, and was about everybody's second choice.

JF: How about Jack Germond? These are just general impressions.

RN: Jack was skeptical of Mo and his ability to do this. If I can be frank, [Jack] early on warned me that if Mo became a front-ranked, leading contender, that he thought that Mo's wife, Ella, would become an issue. And I found that disheartening and disappointing, but being somewhat of a pragmatic guy, and knowing that Ella had a reputation of enjoying life to its fullest, and having a temper, I recognized where this could be a problem. It would have been very disappointing for me, had that happened.

JF: How about Jules Witcover?

RN: Jules liked Mo a lot, and he liked all of us. We all palled around together. He liked Ella. He was always quite pleasant and upbeat when he was around us.

JF: What was your impression of Ella?

RN: I loved Ella, I thought she was great. I knew Ella had her flaws, but she had a heart of gold and she loved Mo so. She put up with us, but she loved Mo, and that's why she did this. Everything that he asked her to do of a public nature was against everything that she held personally. She was insecure about speaking in public, but she loved to sit in the back of the bus and carouse with the press, and they loved her.

JF: How about Hunter Thompson?

RN: I never dealt with Hunter Thompson. Bracy did, but I didn't.

JF: I recall one trip he had with Mo, on Mo's plane, but I don't recall what state it was.

RN: I don't know. Maybe Stout would have known that, but poor Stout's gone.

JF: Yes. How about Bill Plant? Wasn't he another one?

RN: Plant was a guy I didn't know. When I was on the Hill, Connie Chung was the congressional correspondent for CBS. I asked her what she knew about Bill Plant, that he'd been assigned to us, and she said he was great, he was one of the rising stars, that he wouldn't be only negative. And she was right about that. And Ike Pappas was another who was assigned from
CBS to us. They kind of rotated Ike Pappas and.... Oh! Charlie Gibson! That's the name of the ABC reporter I was thinking of. Ike was a little more Washington-oriented and a lot more skeptical of Mo's ability to carry this off. We would make a joke that Pappas every Tuesday night would stand in front of a camera and say, "And this is the end of the Udall campaign." And he did this for about twenty weeks in a row! (laughter)

JF: How discouraging!

RN: Ike was at the memorial. It was good to see him.

JF: Oh, was he?

RN: Yes.

JF: The results of New Hampshire [gave] Carter about 30% and Udall second, six points behind at 24%. How did Mo and you and close staff feel?

RN: We were really, really disappointed. We had hoped against hope that we could carry this off. What hurt us up there, I think, was Jackson's failure to be on the ballot. Had he been on the ballot, he would have taken enough Carter votes off in order for us to squeak by. Jackson's strategy was not to enter New Hampshire, but to do well in Massachusetts. And he campaigned in the Boston market very heavily. Of course Jackson's message would get into New Hampshire because of the Boston TV. It was just another one of the "what ifs," the bad luck things.

JF: The "what ifs," yes. It doesn't make sense to put the money into the Boston media market and not have your name on the New Hampshire ballot.

RN: Jackson had a flawed strategy: skip New Hampshire and go with Massachusetts, and he ended up losing Massachusetts. Actually, he didn't, he won Massachusetts, but it was a hollow victory. I mean, it was busing, and he had turned off labor and turned off the liberals, and he didn't have a chance after that.

JF: Did you work in Massachusetts at all?

RN: I went through there. I didn't work in the state. I went to the debate in Boston that was held, but that was held prior to the New Hampshire Primary.

JF: Where was Mo's headquarters there?

RN: In Boston?

JF: In Boston. Was it the Parker House?

RN: That's kind of the hotel they stayed at a lot, yes. A lot of the activity was out in Newton, and a lot of Mo's--I think his co-chair was Dukakis' sister--and they all lived in Newton, so there
was a big--the Newton liberals.  (chuckles)

JF: And was Dick Stout still the primary campaign person there?

RN: He was. He went all the way through.

JF: And was the national press corps basically the same that was following Mo? Had that shifted at all? Had they gone from a zone coverage to a man-to-man yet?

RN: Yes, we were pretty much.... Chuck Quinn from NBC, Charlie Gibson from ABC, and we had Plant and Pappas and their crews. And there was no CNN or anything at that time. The New York Times was rotating Charlie Moore and Linda Charelton. We got Margo Hornblower a couple of times from The Washington Post. Liz Drew was running for The New Yorker, and she would travel with us and everybody else. So she would spend some time with us, and then pick us up later. AP was playing it regional. We didn't have anybody really on the plane.

JF: Did Mo have his own point men?

RN: Yes.

JF: Do you recall when he picked that up?

RN: Yes, I think it was after Massachusetts when we started seriously campaigning for Wisconsin and New York, and had to actually do a lot of commuting back and forth. So they had two planes, actually. They had The Basler Bomber, which was an old Convair 440, and it used to be the "Air Force One" of Konrad Adenauer, and still had German labels on the seat belts and everything else, and it was a horrible old plane.

JF: Why was it called The Basler Bomber?

RN: It was run by Basler Air Service in Wisconsin--it was chartered from them. One funny story that was in Too Funny to be President: We were waiting in Milwaukee for the plane to come back from New York--Buffalo, I think--and we had a schedule that would start like after nine o'clock Wisconsin time. We were all at the airport waiting for The Basler Bomber to come in, and I noticed that the Secret Service guys were stirring about and looking upset and running around. I couldn't figure out what was happening. We weren't wearing the earplugs or anything. I asked one of the guys who said, "Well, the tower reports they lost the plane over Lake Michigan." "Holy Christ! What happened?!!" And then a minute later, they picked it up. What had happened was that the wind was blowing up Lake Michigan like about 100 miles an hour up where they were, and the plane was making about 90 knots. They were going backwards! The track went off of the radar. (JF laughs)

We also picked up a Fairchild, I think it was an F-27, a prop jet, twin engine. It was configured for executive seating, for making the shorter hops and the ones to fundraisers and what have you--they used that plane. And that was a good plane and gave Mo some area to rest.
It had kind of a fold-out bench seat.

JF: That's the one that I flew in a couple of times.

RN: That was a good plane. That was named *The Flying Tiger*, after Ella.

JF: That's right, that is the one! (laughs) Jules Witcover wrote a book after the campaign called *Marathon*, and in there he indicated that one of the major challenges that the Udall campaign faced in Massachusetts was trying to get the press to focus on the elimination of liberals.

RN: Yes, the word "liberal"?

JF: Well, no, I think it was more the elimination of the liberal pack. In other words....

RN: Oh, winnowing down.

JF: Winnowing down--that's a better term.

RN: Yes, it was thought after New Hampshire that Shriver was gone, although he had to wait 'til after Massachusetts. They thought Bayh was gone. There was some hope that Harris was gone, but Harris, who was a very witty and smart guy, said he'd been winnowed in (laughter) at New Hampshire, because he had done better than people had thought he would do, at the expense of Shriver and Bayh. So there was that phenomenon. People were looking and seeing if they could winnow down some, Mo would survive--then he would be okay.

But there was also another ongoing controversy over the actual term "liberal." You recall in 1976, "liberal" was kind of a pejorative, and it scared off some people. And Jimmy Carter was running as a centrist, and was being forthright about his disdain for liberalism.

JF: And Harris was a “populist.”

RN: Yes, that's right. So what was Mo? Well, Mo determined that he was a “progressive.” We spent a lot of needless time and energy trying to define what was progressive and why was progressive not a liberal. And Mo would tell the story of the law school professor and the student. The law school professor asked the student if he knew the difference between adultery and fornication, and the student said, "No, professor, I've tried them both and can't tell you the difference." (JF laughs)

JF: Well, speaking of the liberal/progressive dichotomy, it did seem that one of the battles Mo fought throughout the 1976 campaign was to somehow toe the line between McGovern and Muskie--the sort of liberal radical image of a McGovern, versus the sort of blandness that was perceived as Muskie--and to some extent, even Mondale. Did you see that as a challenge facing him, to try to.... It seems like that's something he never resolved. He didn't ever quite come out of it--almost as if he never took a stand where he was.
RN: I don't see that. There was competition for support of influential members of Congress, some of those governors, staff people, and we had some key McGovern people and we had some key Muskie people. We had Curtis Gans, an old McCarthy hand. We had Mark Shields, who was a Muskie guy. We transcended that pretty well. Mo was Mo. I think where we got hurt was with labor. Labor had always mistrusted Mo from an old....

JF: Right to work laws.

RN: Right to work thing which he had voted for as an Arizonan. It was a cardinal principle of Arizona politics. That was held against him, and labor was a real problem. Labor also was kind of hanging back, waiting for Humphrey to come in. So what labor did was kind of split things up between all the candidates, and they would give some support, some money, some workers, to almost all the candidates. Case in point on that one: the most clear indication of that was Michigan and Wisconsin where the UAW could have swung those states for one or the other candidate, but instead kind of hung back and gave Mo pretty good support in Wisconsin and very lackluster support in Michigan. And they ended up coming in second in both places, just by a hair.

JF: Wisconsin was the next big test for Mo, and probably the biggest chance for victory for him. Did you travel there?

RN: I did. I took leave from the congressional job and spent a month in Wisconsin.

JF: What was your primary function then?

RN: I was the press lead in the state.

JF: So did you travel with Mo most of the time, or stay in the headquarters?

RN: No, I traveled with him when he was around, but I really desked the press operation in Milwaukee, and Dick did the traveling.

JF: Let me back up just a little bit to Massachusetts. A squabble within the Udall campaign started being a little more obvious in Massachusetts, where Martilla and Kiley were hired as consultants and to do media buys. By then the leadership had undergone several changes. When we got to Wisconsin, a key thing that happened toward the end that people still talk about is that the last few days before the actual primary, very critical media buys were not made; and also that there was something like, I don't know, a 4,000-piece mailing--I forget the quantity--to the rural areas.

RN: The First Congressional District.

JF: And it's that rural area that in the end was a deciding vote to some extent.

RN: Well, there's a flaw in that.
JF: Please, tell me what you remember about that.

RN: We did go dark in the last weekend, and that was a hurtful thing. But Mo had made a promise to Ella and a promise to Stewart, that he wouldn't go into hopeless debt, and he wouldn't mortgage the house for this campaign. When he got into the winning days of the Wisconsin race, it was clear that he didn't have the cash. The Supreme Court had ruled, and the FEC had ruled that no matching funds would be disbursed until the outcome of *Valeo versus Buckley*. Burt Lance had negotiated some bank loans on the equity that would be there, the matching funds. Mo didn't have the banking support to do that. So Carter had money; we were stymied. Stewart kept his word to Mo, Mo kept his word to Ella, but he probably wouldn't have, had not Stewart drawn the line there. And that meant going dark in Madison and Green Bay and Milwaukee on the last weekend before the race, and that meant not sending out that mailing to Dave Obey's congressional district, which was largely where we were taking on Carter on dairy price supports as being two-faced and talking out.... And that was critical. But another critical thing was Fred Harris' unwillingness to drop out and, although he said he wouldn't actively campaign, his unwillingness to go to Madison and tell those people to go for Mo. The margin of victory was narrow, but it could have been overcome in Madison, had we had a united front down there, even without the First District. But the combination of those things was too much.

JF: And Harris withdrew within a day or two of the Primary, as I recall.

RN: Yes, but he still picked up like 4,500 votes out of Dade County.

JF: Actually, I think it may have been more than that. As I recall, Carter won by almost an 8,000-vote margin.

RN: Seven thousand plus, yes.

JF: Out of almost 800,000. And I think Harris got about 8,000 votes.

RN: Yes. But I think Dade County was about 4,500, something like that.

JF: There seems to be a perception among a lot of the field workers, at least, that Martilla and Kiley were pocketing a lot of the money. I mean, not in the illegal sense, but that their business was to buy media, and they earned money off of all the media they bought. Some things like mailings may not have gotten done because of that. Do you have any recollection of that?

RN: No, I don't.

JF: Was the press aware of any of these disputes going on?

RN: Oh, sure! Sure, you don't hide things like that, because both sides, or all parties in the campaign would talk to their friends in the press. There were no secrets on the campaign. And people would write that ... "riven, strife-filled, Udall campaign was starting. . . The only force
holding it together was the candidate." And they were right.

JF: Did Mark Shields eventually become one of the campaign managers?

RN: He did, for Ohio.

JF: Carter's campaign, throughout, seemed to be masters of lowering expectations for themselves, so as to seem more victorious; and then raising expectations regarding their opponents so as to emphasize the loss. How were you as a press person able to counteract that?

RN: It was an expectation game, everybody knew it, and we'd play it as well as we could. It turned out, you know....