

An Oral History Interview

with

DAVID BRODER (part 1)

Washington, D.C.

conducted by
Julie Ferdon

March 5, 1999

The Morris K. Udall Oral History Project
University of Arizona Library, Special Collections

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JF: This is another in a series of oral history interviews that form the Morris K. Udall Oral History Project. Good morning, my name is Julie Ferdon. It's Friday, March 5, [1999], and we're in the office of Pulitzer Prize winning journalist David Broder at *The Washington Post* in Washington, D.C. Thank you, Mr. Broder for participating.

DB: I'm happy to do it.

JF: Let me start just with a little bit of background information. You were born in 1930?

DB: In 1929.

JF: And where?

DB: Chicago Heights, Illinois.

JF: You went to college at....

DB: University of Chicago.

JF: And proceeded to get a master's degree?

DB: Right. Then went into the Army. When I got out of the Army I worked on the Bloomington, Illinois, *Pantagraph*, P-A-N-T-A-G-R-A-P-H; came to Washington at the tail end of 1955, worked for five years for *Congressional Quarterly*; then five years at *The Washington Star*; about a year and a half at *The New York Times* bureau; and I've been here at *The Washington Post* since 1966.

JF: So journalism was your goal from the very beginning?

DB: Yes. I wasn't at all sure you could make a living at it, but I've been lucky.

JF: You're widely considered the dean of political reporting and analysis in this country. What got you into the political aspect of journalism?

DB: I'd always been interested in politics. My parents were not involved, nobody in the family was ever active in a political party, but it was talked about a lot. And going to school in Chicago, which is a great political city, I heard a lot about it. And I was interested in journalism from the very beginning, so it seemed like a natural area to gravitate to.

JF: When did you first become acquainted with Morris Udall?

DB: When he came to the House of Representatives.

JF: In 1961?

DB: Yes.

JF: What was your first impression?

DB: Well, I have to tell you--and this going to be a problem probably throughout--I've reached the age where I don't trust my own memory very well. He was not hard to spot, obviously: one, because most of us knew his brother from his years in the Congress, and Stewart was by that point an important player in the Kennedy administration; and two, because Mo was so big. I mean, he stood out on the floor of the House of Representatives. I cannot tell you that I recall the first time I sat down for an interview with him. I don't have any clear recollection of that.

JF: In 1967, he was one of the very first members of Congress to come out against Vietnam. Did you by any chance cover that?

DB: Again, I would need to go back to the clips. I mean, I remember the event, but what I don't remember is whether I was the person at *The New York Times* who wrote that story. No, I would have been at *The Post* in 1967. My guess is probably not, that probably one of our Hill people wrote that story.

JF: Would that be true also of his races for the speakership against John McCormack?

DB: I remember writing about that because I was doing a column by that point for *The Post*, and I remember writing about the leadership race--both that one and the later race for majority leader. What I remember particularly vividly was that I learned my lesson, which was that trying to dope out from outside what was going to happen in a congressional leadership race was a real fool's game, because there were so many IOUs and so many unsettled scores that you never knew about, and with the secret ballot, that it was the most unpredictable arena of politics. I also learned, because the column that I wrote when he was in the race for majority leader was a column that in effect said, "It'd be terrific if this guy Udall won the race," that members of the House understandably don't appreciate advice from outsiders on something that they regard as their business and not your business.

JF: That was a fairly unprecedented move at that time--especially running against Speaker McCormack.

DB: Yes.

JF: Do you think that in any way hurt him in the House?

DB: Of course it did, yes, no question about it. The House of those days, as some people recalled at the service yesterday--David Obey particularly--was a very hierarchical place, and you played by the old bulls' rules or they tried to take you out of the game. And running against the Speaker was the ultimate act of defiance, because they recognized that if you could knock off a Speaker, then you could knock off anybody else there. So he paid a severe price for that, in terms of ever becoming a leader--formal leader--in the House of Representatives. But he was so good substantively as a legislator, and he had so many allies in what turned out to be a much bigger generation of members of the House, that they couldn't squash him, as they would have liked to have squashed him.

JF: I spoke to Stewart Udall--I believe it was soon before Mo's death, this last December--and he said he'd been thinking about a single word to describe Mo, and the word he'd come up with was audacious.

DB: Yes.

JF: Would that fit, in your experience?

DB: Yes, he was clearly a risk-taker. There's no question about that. But he also laid the groundwork for those challenges, whether it was in policy or in politics. He wasn't a kamikaze, if "audacious" suggests somebody who goes into a fight without thinking about what he's getting into. I think he thought seriously about what he was getting into. But ultimately he did what his conscience prompted him to do, and so he took on a lot of fights that he knew perfectly well were going to be very difficult to win.

JF: In 1971 he was the chief sponsor of the 1971 Campaign Reform Act, which was the first real national attempt to limit campaign expenditures and contributions. You covered multiple campaigns both before and after that act. What would you say the overall effect of the act has been?

DB: Well, it's like almost every other piece of campaign finance legislation, enacted or proposed: The targets that it defined, for the most part it hit. And then over time, we found that either there were ways to evade some of the limits, or that there were unintended consequences. The great thing that the 1971 act did was to bring the whole picture of campaign financing from the darkest dungeons, where you couldn't look in on it, up into the place where there was a good deal of sunlight about it. We learned for the first time what the general dimensions were, and what the sources and the destinations of a lot of that money was. That is a historic achievement. What it failed to do, obviously, was to limit the volume or reduce the influence of donors in this system.

JF: I was wondering to what extent you think that it affected the presidential campaign. Why don't we go ahead with that, with the 1976 presidential campaign.

DB: Well, you had a series of campaigns--I would say probably from 1976 through 1984--some might even say up to 1988--where the financial battlefield was substantially leveled by the availability of federal matching money in the primaries, and by the provision of public funds for the general elections. From that point on, the clever people have been able to figure out how to take that money, pocket it, and then go ahead and raise a whole lot of other money besides. And obviously we've had the phenomenon of millionaire or billionaire candidates who have raised the bar for what's spent in the presidential campaigns, and forced others to become very evasive about those limits. I would say it had at least a temporary salutary effect, and now is beginning to have probably more negative than positive effects. I think the \$1,000 contribution limit has become a huge problem for lesser-known, non-celebrity, non-millionaire candidates being able to compete for the presidency, because the \$1,000 is now worth about \$200 in real money, and the task of raising what you need in amounts of that volume is just almost overwhelming.

JF: Then it's actually now having exactly the opposite effect of what it was intended to do.

DB: That's right. Instead of becoming an enabler of competition, it's become a real barrier to competition.

JF: That's fascinating. Mo would be very disappointed to learn that, I think.

DB: I would like to think that since he was not only principled, but flexible, that he would be among those who said, "If we don't do anything else, let's at least make the \$1,000 contribution limit a realistic contribution limit, and raise it to whatever, \$5,000 or whatever you think it ought to be," which would have a huge effect for helping candidates like John McCain get into the game.

JF: In 1974, when it was clear that Teddy Kennedy wasn't going to enter the Democratic primaries, that November of 1974 Mo announced his candidacy for the presidency. That was a full two years before the election. Was that fairly unusual, announcing that early?

DB: It was very unusual then. I mean, as you know, since then, somebody who starts only two years in advance is regarded as behind the field. (chuckles) But it was unusual then. But I remember talking with him about it at the time, and what he said--again, this is an example of his being audacious but not kamikaze--he said, "I know perfectly well how hard it's going to be for a member of the House of Representatives, who has no national renown, who's only run in one district in a small western state, to be taken seriously as a presidential candidate, and the only way I can do that is if I get started now."

JF: So it was more a matter of feeling like he needed to get in and start working, than preempting the field by getting in then?

DB: I don't think he had any notion that he was going to preempt the field. Even then, there was a lot of speculation about others running--others, including people who either because they were senators or had run for previous national races, like Sargent Shriver, were much better-known names nationally than he was.

JF: So at that point in time in late 1974, what did you think Mo's chances were?

DB: Not great. I mean, there was no history of anybody going straight from the House of Representatives to the presidential nomination, let alone the presidency. And the other thing that was a factor in my mind--I mean they were very different men, and the role of religion in their lives was very different. But having watched the difficulty that George Romney, the former governor of Michigan, had had in his campaign in explaining his Mormon background, I also had in the back of my head a hunch that this was going to take some work on his part to explain who he was.

JF: That that might become an issue?

DB: Yeah.

JF: The next to announce in December of 1974, a month later, was Jimmy Carter, former governor of Georgia at that time. Even though he didn't announce until 1974, my impression is that he was actively working since about 1972 for the nomination. Was that your experience?

DB: That was clearly his agenda. I mean, I remember Carter telling myself and a lot of other reporters, "You all fly through the Atlanta airport all the time. When you're coming through the Atlanta airport, just give me a call, I'd love to just have you come over to the mansion and visit." He was obviously at that point thinking well beyond the borders of Georgia in terms of his campaign. And Bob Strauss spotted his ambitions when Carter asked him--and Carter made the request of Strauss--not the other way around--to take the lead as the sort of informal chairman of the Democratic campaign in the midterm election of 1974. He wanted an excuse to get around the country as his term as governor ended, and one, get himself introduced in a lot of places, and two, pick up whatever chips he could pick up by helping other Democrats in what turned out to be a very good year for the Democrats.

JF: What a wonderful opportunity!

DB: Yes.

JF: Your colleague Jules Witcover in his book *Marathon*, mentioned that Carter was intentionally trying to keep his ambitions away from you in particular, because he seemed to want to.... Well, my impression, frankly, is that he was a master at lowering expectations (chuckles) and was afraid that someone like you would grab onto what he was trying to do

before it was time. Were you aware of that?

DB: I remember reading that in Jules' book, but I certainly wasn't aware of it at the time. It probably would have been in the winter of 1974--like January or February--when the governors had their annual midwinter meeting here in Washington. I remember inviting three southern governors to a lunch here at *The Post* with Mrs. Graham and Don and people from the editorial page and the news side. The three governors were Reuben Askew of Florida, Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, and Jimmy Carter of Georgia. If you had asked me prior to that lunch which of these folks is most likely to bust out of the state and become a real important national player, I probably would have put them in that order: Askew first, Bumpers second, and Carter third. But Carter just took the play away from the other two amazingly at that lunch. And I think a lot of us leaving that lunch said, "Ooo, this guy is . . . , there's more here than we realized."

JF: So it wasn't necessarily just Hamilton Jordan or Jody Powell--it was Carter himself?

DB: Oh! Carter was a great salesman of Carter.

JF: What was your impression of him that early on?

DB: I liked him, because he seemed--I mean, that was the period when we were all writing stories about the new South; their elections had sent us a message that the old racial politics was being put in the background; they were all talking about education reform back then, about lifting their states up off of the bottom of all of the rankings. Askew was particularly impressive because he could talk not just about Florida as a state, but Florida and the Caribbean, and Florida and Latin America and the hemisphere and so on. Bumpers was then, as now, extraordinarily eloquent. And Carter talked a very good game as a reform governor of Georgia. I mean, you have to remember what he followed. He'd followed a bunch of segs [segregationists] who were in many cases also pretty corrupt there, and here was this squeaky clean guy who talked a very good game about how he was reforming the politics of his state. So I was impressed.

JF: After Carter announced and Mo announced and Kennedy was clearly out of it, there was more or less of a liberal stampede to run. Several liberals jumped into the race, including Harris, Sanford, Governor Shapp of Pennsylvania, Sargent Shriver--as you mentioned--Birch Bayh.

DB: Yes.

JF: At that point in time, what were your thoughts of the chances of Sargent Shriver, Fred Harris of Oklahoma, and

DB: I thought Birch Bayh was the likeliest to emerge. In fact, I had a son--my oldest son was at the University of Wisconsin and was kind of screwing around in school and not doing very much, and he was interested in working in one of the campaigns, and I thought, and Ann, my

wife, thought it wouldn't be a bad idea for him to take some time off from school because maybe he'll be more serious about it when he goes back to school. I said, "Look, I cover these people (laughs). I can't get you a job, that's not--that doesn't go. But if you ask my advice which campaign I'd try to hook up with, I would tell you Birch Bayh." And he got a job, first as a volunteer, and then they put him on, eventually, as a gopher at fifty bucks a week or whatever the hell they paid him on the thing. So that was my judgment, that Birch Bayh, because of his labor ties, and because he'd been a hell of a campaigner in Indiana, was probably the guy who would come out of that group.

JF: He was probably the more seasoned campaigner (DB: Yes.) of them all.

DB: Yes, and had been through tough campaigns in Indiana.

JF: The first real test of political strength, then, was Iowa, the Iowa Caucus in January of 1976. (DB: Yes.) There was apparently a lot of debating--at least within the Udall campaign--regarding whether New Hampshire was still the first real test, or whether Iowa was now going to be the first real test. What did you think at the time?

DB: I thought New Hampshire. In fact, I barely went to Iowa in 1976. I think Jules [Whitcover] was out there some for *The Post*, but I was not. I focused almost entirely on New Hampshire.

JF: So you didn't travel with him at all in Iowa?

DB: I may have. We did kind of an informal sort of division of labor here, as we always do, but Jules spent a lot more time in Iowa than I did. I may have gone out there once or twice when he was doing other things, but basically I focused on New Hampshire in that cycle.

JF: Apparently also in Mo's campaign there was a lot of debate as to whether--because of not knowing what the role of Iowa would be--how much time and money he should spend there, compared to New Hampshire. Some felt strongly that he should sort of blow off Iowa, and others didn't feel that way. In 20x20 hindsight, seeing what happened with Carter winning there, and having built up expectations to some extent for Mo, and building down expectations for himself, or lowering them, in retrospect do you think it was a mistake for Mo to have gone in there to begin with, or to have not have campaigned more strongly there?

DB: Well, it's so easy.... There were about twenty different points, I suppose, where given the narrowness of what turned out to be the crucial things, you would have said he would have been better off to try to slow Carter down at this point, or catch him at this point, or try to find some way to beat him at this point--and Iowa was one of them. I mean, Carter got a huge lift out of Iowa, in part because [*New York Times* political reporter] Johnny Apple turned Iowa almost single-handedly into a big national story in that cycle for the first time, and so Carter, who

actually, my recollection is, ran second to "none of the above" in the Iowa caucuses.

JF: To undecided, exactly.

DB: [Carter] was proclaimed as the great winner there, and clearly had that head of steam coming into New Hampshire then.

JF: And as it turned out, Mo came in fifth, below the "undecided" in that.

DB: Yes.

JF: What is it about New Hampshire, which was the next big test, the New Hampshire Primary. What is it about New Hampshire, this small New England state, that so dominates the political scene, to the point where it's at least seen as selecting our presidential candidates?

DB: Well, my smartass response is that "that's the way God intended it." I mean, you can look up in the Bible and find, "And New Hampshire shall choose the president." The serious answer is that first events are always important. I mean, why is the Kentucky Derby more important than the Preakness or the Belmont? Why was the first man on the moon a national hero and nobody can probably tell you who was on the second mission to the moon? Firsts are firsts, and we are, whatever—"programmed"—to give very great attention to first events. And they have been, over the years, the first time that people actually go to a polling place to vote on who's going to be the next president.

JF: In New Hampshire Carter ended up winning by 30% and Mo coming in second by 24%, with Bye at 16%, Harris 11%, Shriver 9%. Had Mo stayed out of Iowa and concentrated strictly on New Hampshire--candidate time and money--do you think he would have pulled out a win?

DB: Might have, but that's one of those things that I don't know how you play back the history with that. I mean, it would not have denied Carter the momentum of an Iowa victory, and it might have produced additional people or resources for New Hampshire for him. I think the thing that really caused him the problem was that the left of the Democratic Party, in broad terms, was loaded up with lots of folks, and Carter--because Jackson did not play in New Hampshire--Carter had the middle and the right, and the New Hampshire Democratic Party is not--and particularly then was not a particularly liberal party. It was Catholic ethnic, very weak labor organized labor element, and a lot of those folks were very comfortable with the more middle road to conservative message that Carter was delivering.

JF: So he was practically the only act in town for those people (DB: That's right.) when you consider Harris and the others.

DB: And he put on a very, very good disciplined campaign up there. At that point, there was a

lot of novelty to him, and so people were hearing this for the first time. And Carter was an enormously disciplined candidate. What I mean by that is he would just deliver.... He had been doing it for so long by the time he got to New Hampshire, that he had his stump speech down to an exact formula, and he would deliver that formula speech, if necessary, twelve times a day. He never deviated, he never cheated an audience, he was just absolutely relentlessly focused on delivering that particular message. And two years after Watergate, it was a very powerful message: "I am not a lawyer, that's my great disadvantage. I will never lie to you." I mean, those are things which in a normal political situation people would not say, "Well, therefore he ought to be president--because he's not a lawyer and because he says he will never lie to us." But two years after Watergate, those things had enormous resonance.

JF: And he ran very much as an outsider.

DB: Very much of an anti-Washington campaign.

JF: (inaudible)

DB: And the fact that almost all the others had some tie or other to official Washington also was an advantage in that environment.

JF: My understanding is that the other candidates--Mo included--were getting somewhat frustrated with his refusal to hit issues head-on

DB: Yes.

JF: Had you noticed that in following him?

DB: Oh, sure. And it became a theme of the coverage of him--not so much in New Hampshire, but after New Hampshire. And Jerry Rafshoon, who was making the ads, when they got to Pennsylvania, ran exactly the same ads, but they put a little line at the beginning of the thing with the narrator saying, "Jimmy Carter on the issues." And then it was the same pitch. (chuckles) They sort of tipped their hat to saying, "Hey, you ought to talk issues." So they said, "Jimmy Carter on the issues." (laughter)

JF: That's wonderful. There was a sense that Carter got better press coverage in New Hampshire than the other candidates. Is that true?

DB: Well, "better" if you mean volume, yes, because he came out of Iowa as the surprise winner of Iowa--so in that sense. I don't think he got more.... Again, I haven't gone back to look at the stories for a long time, but I would be surprised if it was better in terms of more favorable, because my impression was that if you had taken a secret vote among the reporters, Udall would have won hands down.

JF: Why is that?

DB: Because he was funny and fun to be around. Carter was never.... Carter had a job he was going to do, and he recognized that having the press around went with the territory, but he wasn't interested in making friends among the press, he was interested in doing something with the voters. And the longer he went on, the more tense that relationship with the press became. If you're getting heavily into the Carter side of the thing, a guy you ought to talk to is Curtis Wilkie who was *The Boston Globe* reporter on Carter--now lives in and works for the *Boston Globe* out of New Orleans. But Curtis is a Mississippian, and he had grown up with wonderful sort of (laughs) politicians like Jimmy Carter all his life. And those two.... I mean, Carter could never con Curtis, and because he never could con him, Curtis got under his skin like nobody else did. And he can tell you wonderful stories about what the relationship was between Carter and the reporters covering him.

JF: That's great! So you're saying among the press corps, at least by this time, Mo would have won a personality test against Carter. What about a straw poll as to who they'd prefer to have as president at that time?

DB: I don't know that the results would have been any different. We didn't have a whole lot of basis for judging any.... In terms of credentials for national leadership, Scoop Jackson probably was the credentialed candidate. I remember hearing Moynihan, who was supporting Jackson, make a speech somewhere for Jackson, where he talked about Scoop having "the charisma of competence." And Jackson had been a powerful senator, and a really influential senator for a long time. And if there was anybody in that field who was presidential, in terms of the stature that he had before the race began, it was Jackson.

JF: That sort of moves us into the Massachusetts Primary. Massachusetts is generally considered a liberal state. In 1972, it was the only state that went for McGovern. And yet Jackson won there. Why was that?

DB: Because they had decided as a basic strategy they weren't going to screw around with Iowa and New Hampshire, that they were going to put their marker down in Massachusetts, and they went in.... There's some real Democratic organizations.... I mean, that's a Democratic state with a lot of Democratic office-holders who have real organizations in that state. And they had gone in and signed up, and in some cases bought up, a lot of that organizational support. And in the primary, that turned out to be enough.

JF: In Massachusetts Mo tried very hard, from what I understand, to get the press to focus more on the elimination of the liberal field, because that was, it appeared, what was killing him. (DB: Yes.) So many people on the liberal side, and they were just taking votes away from each other, and away from Mo in particular. (DB: Yes.) Did the press pick up on that?

DB: Well, it was clear, I think, to us too, that as long as there were five or six folks on the liberal side of the party, competing against--there were two at that point, one with Carter and Jackson, who had positioned themselves as being centrists--that the centrist candidate would win. And it was also clear by that point that Jackson, as a campaigner, was not in Carter's class, so that it was likely it was going to be Carter, who would benefit from the fraction of the other thing. But the truth is, reporters don't decide when candidates enter or leave the race--that's up to the candidates. I mean, the one power that the press has at that point is who do you cover, who do you pay attention to? But it was hard at that point, since nobody from that side of the party had won anything yet, to say, "Well, he's a real candidate, but these other three or four are not."

JF: It's interesting to me--I always have this question--who is manipulating whom when it comes between the press and the candidates?

DB: Yes.

JF: The candidates try very hard to play this game of lowering or raising expectations: lowering it for themselves so that if they do well, they get more attention from the press and the public; and often raising it for their opponent, so that if they don't do as well, it's considered more of a defeat. Who is manipulating whom here?

DB: Everybody. Everybody. I mean, the public gets messages from two sources, essentially: one, from the candidates, and two, from the press. Since public opinion, as registered first in polls and then in primaries, is the determinant there, there is just a constant interaction going on. And the only answer to your question is both.

JF: The next primary was Florida. Mo decided not to go into Florida, to basically leave it to Carter for the purpose of knocking Wallace out of the campaign.

DB: Yes.

JF: He apparently later regretted that in retrospect, and thought that if he had gone in, he would have pulled away enough from Carter that Carter wouldn't have such a clear win to give him the momentum that he had. What was your opinion? Should Mo have gone in?

DB: I don't know. Again, I don't know. And I didn't go to Florida myself that year. I was, I think, either back here or out in Wisconsin already.

JF: Okay. Jules Witcover noted that it was around Florida or so it seems that Jimmy Carter's temper started showing itself. Were you aware of a temper? Had you ever experienced it, ever seen it?

DB: Yes. I mean, Carter, with those pale blue eyes, when you had done something or asked a question or written something, [they] would just almost stare through you. I was, at least speaking for myself, I was never verbally abused by Carter, but lots of times you'd just get that cold, implacable stare.

JF: I had heard that he could really come down on his staff hard sometimes. Is that anything you were aware of?

DB: You heard that. I didn't witness that.

JF: Illinois was a non-binding preference primary which Carter entered and only spent, I think, four days and \$130,000 or something--a pretty small investment, comparatively. Carter came in first and Wallace second. I think everybody else pretty much just ignored it. Was that a mistake, do you think?

DB: These questions about "was this a mistake or that a mistake," I feel not really comfortable with, just simply because generically, one, I don't think reporters are very smart political strategists. If we were, we'd be doing that work and so on. And second, the temptation to pretend that you knew all the time what was the better way to do it is so overwhelming. I don't think that's a very fruitful area for me, at least, to play in.

JF: There's so many variables.

DB: Yes. And the interesting thing, to me, about what happened in Illinois--and I was in Illinois--was that--and again, this is mainly a Carter story, not a Udall story--but Carter's interests in Illinois were being managed by a man named Jim Wall, who was and is the editor of *The Christian Century* magazine, and a Southern Baptist minister himself. And he was drawn very early to Carter because they came out of the same culture and he understood Carter. In fact, [he] helped me understand that aspect of Carter's background more than anybody else, because it's a long way from my own cultural background. But the remarkable thing that Jim Wall was able to do was to build a bridge between the Carter folks and Mayor Daley's organization, which turned out, ultimately, to have great importance, because when Carter began to run into trouble in the later primaries, it was the comment of Mayor Daley, the day after the Ohio Primary, that "it's over and Carter's our nominee and we ought to all rally around him," that turned out to be very significant.

JF: Hm, interesting. By the time of Wisconsin, which was, I guess, the next big test, who were you covering?

DB: I was spending most of my time with Udall at that point.

JF: Why?

DB: I think.... The honest answer is, I can't remember sort of how we sorted it out, and it may have been that I just said, "I'd like to.... Let me do this week or two weeks with Udall, and then we'll switch." The *Post* has never--at least in the time I've worked here--done what some other papers have done, which is to sort of put one particular reporter on one particular candidate from Day One and said, "become the world's leading expert on this candidate." We have tended always to sort of rotate people around. So it wasn't that this was now a permanent assignment, but I did spend most of my time out there with Udall.

JF: Wisconsin, again, was a traditionally liberal state, which Mo, I think, had really hoped to find his first victory there. Mo started his campaign there, I think, early in 1975. Carter came in quite a bit later, but by that time he had a lot of momentum. My impression was that he worked very hard in Wisconsin to convince the press that he was an underdog there.

DB: That Carter was.

JF: That Carter was an underdog there--so that that would amplify whatever he did. Is that something you were aware of at the time?

DB: What I can, I think, genuinely recall was that the feeling was that if there was anyplace where the political environment was made to order for Udall, it was Wisconsin, because the Democratic Party out there was a pretty liberal party. The anti-war credentials were going to be much more important to him there than any other place that he had run so far. The support that he had from members of the House delegation gave him a kind of a plausibility in that state that he hadn't had the same advantage, say, in.... I mean, there was nobody like that in New Hampshire to vouch for him up there.

JF: I think the vote there ended up being 8,000.

DB: We had about 150,000 papers that night that had Udall winning, because I was working at the NBC affiliate out there, and NBC called the state. And Richard Scammon, who was there, an elections analyst, somebody that I'd known for a long time, had absolute reliability with, and one of the hardest phone calls I ever had to make was a call to my editors here about forty-five minutes after we'd decided to call the state for Udall saying, "I think we've got a problem. His lead's really eroding."

JF: Did you pull those papers, or were they ever circulated?

DB: I think they exist. There was one edition. Luckily, it wasn't the big edition of the paper, but there....

JF: One edition did get out. (DB: Yes.) That was a real heartbreaker, I think, for everybody

concerned. New York was....

DB: You know the story--which I think was later authenticated, probably in Jules' book--that they decided that they would not spend the money for one final mailing to the rural counties in the state--the Udall people did--and that they later thought that if he'd done that last mailing that they had talked about.... Because he got beat in the farm counties.

JF: Well, his book indicated, as I recall, that they were trying.... By then, Mo's campaign had gotten Marttila and Kiley involved.

DB: Yes.

JF: Professional consultants. And they really wanted to make one last big media buy.

DB: Yes. Maybe it was a media buy and not a mailing.

JF: I think they wanted to do one last media buy that they felt was critical, but in the whole process of that, that mailing got dropped--the mailing to the rural counties. I don't know that there was ever a decision made "we're not going to do it." I think it was a finance thing.

DB: Yes.

JF: And as I...