An Oral History Interview

with

John J. Rhodes (part 1)

Mesa, Arizona

conducted by
Peter Steere

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The Morris K. Udall Oral History Project
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PS: Good morning. It's Wednesday, March 19, 1997, and we are in the home of Arizona Congressman John J. Rhodes, on West Mountainview Drive, in Mesa, Arizona. My name is Peter Steere, and I would like to thank and welcome you, Mr. Rhodes, to another in a series of oral history interviews that form part of the Morris K. Udall oral history project, and I would like to thank you very much for participating in this.

I think, Mr. Rhodes, I'd like to start with just a little bit of background. I wondered if you could talk a little bit about how you came to Arizona. You were born in Kansas, I believe. Could you tell me how you came to come to Arizona?

JR: Well, I didn't do it on my own volition. I was stationed at Williams Air Force Base during World War II. And actually, I had gone to Kansas State University, and you had to take ROTC, so I took two years and decided I might as well take two more. And so I had a commission. Then I went to Harvard Law School and kept up the commission, got promoted to first lieutenant, and when I graduated I almost literally got my degree in my one hand and my orders to active duty in the other. I was stationed at Baker Field, California, for three months, and we were told then that we would be going to ACAFS #7, Higley, Arizona. And at the same time, they were giving us lessons in Spanish. So I wrote my wife, Betty—we were then engaged, but not married yet—and told her that when we were married we probably would live either in Higley, Arizona, or South America. She wrote back and said, "Well, in some ways, I hope it's in South America, 'cause I know where that is! Where is Higley, Arizona?" (laughs) Anyway, it was Higley, Arizona, which later became Williams Air Force Base, and that's how I got to Arizona.

PS: When I was reading your book recently, my recollection was, when you were talking about growing up in Kansas, your father, grandfather, you had a history of being active in the Republican Party in Kansas, is that not true?

JR: My father, yes. Well, and my grandfather too. My grandfather was county treasurer of Anderson County, Kansas. But my father was a retail lumberman in Council Grove, which was in Morris County. But Alf Landon was governor, and there was a scandal in the state treasurer's office, and the state treasurer was fired—well, he had to resign. And Alf Landon called my father and said, "Jake, I want to appoint you state treasurer." And my dad said, as he's told me, "Alf, I'm just a retail lumberman. I don't have any expertise at finance." And Alf said, "Jake, I don't care about that. I need an honest man, and Jake, you're honest." So my dad said, "Well, Alf, if that's the way you want it, that's the way it'll be." So he was appointed and served out the term of state treasurer, and then ran twice and was elected. I got involved in politics, in helping my father get elected state treasurer of Kansas twice.

PS: Mr. Rhodes, after the war and you and Betty had settled here in Arizona and you'd started a law practice, how did you become involved, and what was influential in your decision to go into politics, into public service?

JR: There again, it was a bit of an accident, but as you said, I had begun to practice law in Mesa and, after a while, I was doing well enough in the law practice so that I could
afford to start looking for Republicans. In those days, they were hard to find. But we finally had enough young Republicans to start a Young Republican Club. Then we had a state convention and invited Howard Pyle who was a very famous--for Arizona, at least--radio commentator, to speak to us. He did, and he was so eloquent and so forthcoming as far as the Republican Party was concerned, that after he left, we unanimously drafted Howard Pyle to run for governor. And I said to myself, "He'll never do it, because this is such a Democratic state." But he decided to do it! And he appointed Barry Goldwater, a merchant, very well-known and well-respected man in Phoenix, as his campaign manager.

So about two weeks later, I'm sitting in my law office, doing the best that I could to practice a little law, and the secretary said, "Mr. Goldwater's on the phone," and so I picked it up. I had never met Barry at that time, but he said, "Mr. Rhodes, I understand you're a lawyer." I said, "Yes." He said, "Did you vote to draft Howard Pyle for governor?" I said, "Yes, I certainly did." And he said, "Well, he has drafted me to be his campaign manager." I said, "Well, that's wonderful." He said, "Well, as you know, Mr. Rhodes, in Arizona we have the straight vote, but you can't get people to vote a straight Republican ticket unless the ticket's full. We're having to fill all of the positions on the ballot, so Mr. Rhodes, I'm drafting you to run for attorney general." I gulped and said, "Well, Mr. Goldwater, there's something you should know. I like the practice of law, but I do not want to be attorney general." He said, "Well, Mr. Rhodes, there's something you should know. You won't be attorney general. The situation is that this is a very Democratic state, and you're not gonna win." So I said, "Well, with that understanding, okay, I'll run." And I did.

Howard and Barry and I--Barry had a little single-engine Beach Bonanza--and we traveled around the state campaigning and got to be pretty close friends. Howard Pyle won, and I did not, as predicted, but two years later Howard was running for reelection, Barry was running for the Senate, and I got importuned to run for the seat in Congress in the First District. After long conversations with Betty, it was decided that yes, we would do that as a party service. So we did.

PS: 1952, I think many historians have seen as a real turning point in Arizona political history. Senator Goldwater won election for the first time in 1952, upsetting Ernest MacFarland, who was majority leader of the United States Senate. If my memory serves me right, you upset Congressman John Murdock, who, if again my memory serves me right, was chairman of the Interior Committee (JR: That's correct.) which always has been a fairly important committee position, which Mo filled many years later, in terms of activities relating to the western states, particularly. Your upset of Murdock in 1952 and Senator Goldwater's upset--because I think they really were upsets, particularly Senator Goldwater of MacFarland, because MacFarland was a fairly powerful figure in the United States Senate. In reminiscing, thinking back, what do you attribute those upset victories to?

JR: Well, I really attribute them mainly to the fact that Dwight Eisenhower was the Republican candidate, and his coattails were rather huge. Barry and I have often sort of
joked about it, "Well, Ike won on our coattails, didn’t he." (laughter) But that was the main thing. But Arizona is a conservative state, and at that time the Democratic Party nationally was beginning to get the name for being quite liberal. The Taft-Hartley Act had been passed, and Truman had vetoed it, and it was passed over his veto. And that was a big issue. You know, Harry Truman is a very well-respected and popular ex-president, but I'll tell you, in the late forties, he had his problems. If he had been able to run for president in 1952, he would have been shellacked. So I think those are the main reasons that Barry and I.... Actually, John Murdock had a very bad primary. He had two opponents, and they just.... John had always said, "When I get to be chairman of the Interior Committee, we will be able to vote out the Central Arizona Project authorization." Well, he couldn't do it, he couldn't get it out of his own committee. And so his opponents in the primary painted him as being an old man who had lost his marbles and so on and so forth--all of which was not true. But nevertheless, that was the image which was facing him when the general election came about. So I didn't say a word in the general election about John Murdock, except to say that I was not going to swim for election on the Colorado River, as some of the people had done, including John Murdock, but that I would do my very best to make sure that we had the Central Arizona Project authorized. And also I said, "Dwight Eisenhower is going to be the next president of the United States, and Ike needs me!" (chuckles) Anyway, it worked!

PS: Mr. Rhodes, when you first joined the Arizona delegation in 1952, obviously Senator Goldwater was joining it for the first time, along with yourself. Senator Hayden was already there in place, and I believe (JR: Porky Patton [phonetic spelling].) [Harold A.] Porque Patten was District 2, because Arizona only had two districts then. Pork Patton was the District 2....

JR: Incidentally, he pronounced it Por Que. He didn't want to be Porky, P-O-R-K-Y, it was P-O-R-Q-U-E, Porque, and nobody knows quite why.

PS: One of the things I was interested in was when you first joined the delegation as a freshman congressmen, your first meetings with Senator Hayden.... Senator Hayden, to those of us today is almost a legendary (PS: He is) figure. What was it like to meet him for the first time? And can you remember the first time you met him?

JR: Oh, yes! I certainly do. Well, naturally, when I got to Washington, I went over to call on Senator Hayden. After all, he was the head of the delegation, and we sat and chatted for a while. Yes, I was with fear and trepidation, because I didn't know how he would receive a brash young lawyer from Mesa who had just been elected in an upset over one of his own Democratic peers. But he was very kind to me and said that whatever I needed in the way of support to get my office started and so on and so forth, his people would provide. And they did! The Hayden office staff was just great to me, always were. And so was the senator.

PS: How about Congressman Patton? Did you work together in the first term?

JR: Oh, absolutely. Porque--I called him Porky, and he kept saying, "Porque, John!"
(chuckles) He once said, "It's interesting when you look at the way Arizona was divided into districts, isn't it?" I said, "Yes, it is." He said, "You have Maricopa County, which is in the middle of the state, and I have the rest of the state. You could say that I have the doughnut, and you have the hole." (laughter) I said, "Yes, Porque, you could say that, but you'd better not!" So yes, we got along very well. And his wife, Mary, was very kind to Betty. And in fact, the inaugural ball, when Eisenhower was inaugurated, we went with the Pattons and it was the worst organized inaugural ball you ever saw in your life! After being in a traffic jam for three hours, we finally got to the gymnasium at the Georgetown University, and it was just belly-to-belly, like most Washington affairs. So we stayed for twenty-five minutes or so, and then the four of us went to a White Castle and got a couple of hamburgers. But the Pattons were very good people, and very good to us.

PS: Congressman Patton loses in 1954, to Stewart Udall?

JR: No, he did not lose. Porque Patton did not run in 1954.

PS: He chose not to run?

JR: He chose not to run.

PS: Okay. Stewart ran in the primary then?

JR: That's correct.

PS: I'm trying to remember who Stewart's Republican opponent was in 1954. I can't recall right off the top of my head.

JR: Well, it was ... Henry Zipf, Z-I-P-F.

PS: Stewart wins the election. (JR: Yes.) And takes office, is now the District 2, Arizona's second congressman. (JR: Correct.) Do you recall when you met Stewart for the first time?

JR: Well, after he was elected, I had not known him before. He was a gung-ho Democrat if there ever was one. And since there was a Democratic Congress, the Democrats weren't really being very kind to Republicans. If Stew had asked me, as he didn't, if he should go on the Interior Committee, I would have told him no, because I was on the Interior Committee, and there were only two of us, and it seemed to me that it would be better if he would go on Public Works or some one of the other committees that were also very important to the state. Well, he decided not to do that. And so we mainly worked together, although our philosophies were not very compatible. Stew was, in my way of thinking, a very liberal Democrat, and he thought that I was a very conservative Republican, and we were both right. But we didn't let it get to be a sword between us. In fact, I think the first time I ever heard the little saying, "You don't have to be disagreeable just because you disagree," that maybe Stew and I applied it to each other. And we
weren't. Personally, we got along extremely well.

PS: Did your working relationship with Stewart change at all after he left Congress and was appointed secretary of Interior in the Kennedy administration? Did your working relationship change?

JR: Well, it was completely different, because, of course, as secretary of Interior he had responsibilities and areas of interest that were beyond whatever I would be doing. I left the Interior Committee in 1958 and went to the Appropriations Committee, so there wasn't as much reason for us to work together at that time, as when we did later on.

PS: Morris Udall gets elected in 1961, special election, to succeed this brother, who resigned after actually winning his fourth term. (JR: That's right.) Mo takes office in late spring, early summer of 1961, the special election. Do you recall meeting Mo for the first time?

JR: Oh, yes. I had met Mo before, I think at a couple of bar conventions. We got along amazingly well, always did. But Mo was also a pretty liberal Democrat. We had this little thing goin', from time to time, after we got to know each other quite well. We'd have a tough vote on the floor, I'd vote one way, and Mo would vote another. One of us would say to the other--and I think I started it--"When you're so smart, Mo, how can you be wrong so often?!" And his answer was, "Same to you, fellah!" (laughter) So that's sort of the way we did it. Of course when we really got into a situation where we wanted to work together and had to work together, was after we had won the lawsuit with California and started working on authorization of the Central Arizona Project.

PS: Your working relationship with Morris in Congress, with Stewart, now as secretary of Interior, Senator Goldwater, and Senator Hayden still there, getting close to retirement, but he's still there. There seems to have been an amazing ability of all of you to work together toward the CAP goal. I mean, when I read back through the histories that have been written, the newspaper clippings of the time, even though all of you represent differing political views--you know, you and Senator Goldwater certainly a little closer together than you and Stewart and Morris were--but you were able to work together for something that obviously had been a political issue for Arizona for a long, long time.

JR: Absolutely.

PS: How and why were you able to do this, in terms of . . . we see in Congress today--and again, maybe it's just the media--we see people spitting at each other all the time. This group of people in the late fifties, early sixties, really came together, and then through 1968 with the final authorization, to achieve a goal. I wonder if you could speak a little bit, Mr. Rhodes, to the ability of all of you to work together, and then also with organizations back in the Arizona Interstate Stream Commission, the CAP organizations in the state, all of you working together for one goal.

JR: Well, there's one piece of the picture that you need to bring in, which I'll bring you
right now. And you'll recall this. In 1964, Barry Goldwater ran for president, so he did not run for the Senate, and so therefore he was not in the Senate during the time that we were really working on the authorization of the Central Arizona Project. Paul Fannin, who had been governor for three terms, was the senator. When people ask me to describe Paul Fannin, I say, he is probably the finest man I ever knew, and he is. Paul was a wonderful senator and wonderful friend. He fit right into the picture, and was one of the reasons that we were able to work together so well. Stew, being secretary of Interior, was a great asset to Arizona and to us, because one of the big compromises that was made, when we were really charging to get the authorization, was dropping the Bridge Canyon Dam from the project in exchange for permission to put a coal-fired plant to produce power needed to lift the water from the Colorado River up through the Buckskin Tunnel into Central Arizona. That probably would not have been—we probably wouldn't have been able to accomplish that, if we hadn't had somebody as secretary of Interior who really understood the situation and had the clout to do what he did. That alone got one of the main opponents of the Central Arizona Project on the Interior Committee to come right around and be for it--John Saylor. John Saylor was the ranking Republican on the Interior Committee at that time. And he was Mr. Conservation. The Sierra Club and all those people thought that John Saylor hung the moon—and they should, because he really did a job for them. And it was mainly through Stew that we were able to get the commitment that if we agreed to drop Bridge Canyon, that those entities led by John Saylor would then turn around and support the CAP.

PS: At the time, Congressman Aspinall was a problem.

JR: He sure was.

PS: Could you talk a little bit about that?

JR: Yes. Wayne Aspinall was a good friend. We were both Masons, thirty-third degree, and Beta Theta Pi brothers, and so on and so forth, and good friends. But Wayne, for some reason—I think that he thought that he had to protect Colorado—was very hard-nosed about the Central Arizona Project. He was doubting that the water supply was sufficient to make it feasible. He never did quite get in bed with "the radical conservationists," as I called 'em. Nevertheless, he was carrying water for them on his back. So it was very difficult to get him to even be fair with us as far as consideration in that committee was concerned. So this was in 1968. There had been hearings in the Interior Committee of the House, but there was no mark-up of the bill, and after the hearings the matter was just postponed. And the law which was passed back in the forties provided that the Congress should adjourn each year by July 31.

Well, along comes July 31, and Wayne Aspinall lets it be known—in fact, I think he made a speech on the floor—that he was a law-abiding citizen, and the law is that Congress was to adjourn on July 31, and he, Wayne Aspinall, was adjourning. And he did! He went home! Mo and I said, "What are we gonna do?!" "Well," I said, "let's just raise hell with him." We made a few speeches on the floor, things like that, getting nowhere at all. And then we got with Floyd Dominy and I, and I think Mo was there,
too. Floyd said, "John, why don't you use the position that Carl Hayden has, to run around Wayne Aspinall?" I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "Well, you are the ranking Republican on the Public Works Appropriations Subcommittee." And I said, "Yes." He said, "You have already passed your bill, have you not?" I said, "Yes." He said, "It's in the Senate, and why don't you get Senator Hayden to put an authorization of the Central Arizona Project on that Public Works Appropriations Bill?" I said, "Good Lord, if we did that, and assuming it stayed there through the Senate and came back to the House, it would be bad on a point of order." He said, "But, you could go to the Rules Committee, and get a rule waiving points of order." I said, "Yes, if we had all kinds of supports from Democrats, we could."

Well, anyway, that's what we did. Hayden put it on the Senate bill, the Public Works Appropriations Bill, came out, and right away Wayne Aspinall found out about it, and he started making phone calls. Well, in the meantime, we had talked to the Speaker of the House, John McCormack, and John McCormack had agreed to—if it came back to the House with that amendment on it—that he would submit it to the Rules Committee to get a rule waiving points of order. And then we had to talk to old Mike Kirwan. Mike was chairman of the Public Works Subcommittee, and Mike and I got along very well, but he was also chairman of the Democratic Congressional Committee, so he wasn't very helpful to Republicans as Republicans. So I said, "I've got to have Carl Hayden come over here and talk to him." So I got Roy Olson and Roy said, "Okay, we'll be over there at such-and-such a time." I made an appointment, we met in Mike Kirwan office, and those two had known each other for a long time. Carl was in his late eighties, and Mike Kirwan wasn't much younger, and both of 'em deaf as a post. (chuckles) I made sure that Gene Wilhelm, who was the chief clerk of the Public Works Subcommittee of the House, would be there, because I wanted him to hear what was going to be said. So after the two octogenarians had reminisced a bit, finally Mike Kirwan said, "Carl, I'm not at all sure I know what it is that you and John want to do, but if you want it, I'm for you." I turned to Wilhelm, "Gene, did you hear that?" He said, "Yes, I did hear that."

So anyway, we had Wayne Aspinall completely boxed in, and he found that out and came roaring back to Washington, called his committee to order and they proceeded to mark up the Central Arizona Project Bill, and he proceeded to tell everybody what his price was, which was nine Reclamation projects in his districts in Colorado—most of them sort of dogs as far as the benefit-to-cost ratio was concerned. In my own defense, I've got to say I didn't have much to do with those negotiations, because they didn't want a Republican around in that, and I was just as happy not to be there. But anyway, that was accomplished. But the last thing that he wanted was the proviso that the Colorado project would proceed on the same pace as the Central Arizona Project, as far as financing was concerned. And of course authorization is just a hunting license. After that you've got to get the money. So Mo said to me, "John, I don't really want to give in on that." "Mo, don't worry about it, because he's got his power, and we've got ours. Ours is in Appropriations. I guarantee you that if this authorization bill goes through, we will finance the Central Arizona Project and I don't care if nobody ever finances those Colorado projects, but I'm not gonna help him!" And so Mo said, "Well, why not?" So that's what we did.
PS: Was Congressman Aspinall irritated with you?

JR: Not really. Not really. Unfortunately, he was defeated in the next election. I don't know whether the authorization had anything to do with it or not. I hope it didn't. But he lost. That was a good Republican year--1968 was. But Clint Anderson, the senator from New Mexico, also put his oar in. He wanted a dam authorized as part of the CAP on the Upper Gila in New Mexico, so okay. (chuckles) It got to be weighted down with pork. But it didn't founder. As a matter of fact, much to everybody's surprise, we got it onto the floor, with a rule waiving points of order, and it was adopted by voice vote, there was never a recorded vote in the House on the Central Arizona Project.

PS: Backing up just a step, the 1986 Congress, I believe, is when Congressman Tabor [phonetic spelling] of New York asked you to join the Appropriations Committee?

JR: That's correct.

PS: You talked a little bit about that. This appears to me to have been, in terms of the upcoming battle a few years down the road, the fact that you were on the Appropriations Committee played an important role, as well as Stewart being secretary of Interior, Senator Hayden, the octogenarian with all the connections and all the influence being there, all this worked together. But your joining the Appropriations Committee--is that when you left the Interior Committee?

JR: Yes.

PS: I'm not sure the CAP was the reason you did that back then, but was there a personal reason for you leaving Interior and joining Appropriations?

JR: Well, one of them was, of course, that Stew was on the Interior Committee, and I realized that if we did get the authorization, it was going to be very important to have somebody on the proper subcommittee, which was Public Works, on the House side. And frankly, Senator Hayden was getting older and it was possible that he wouldn't be with us at that particular time. So I always did have just a little bit of a guilt complex that I had defeated John Murdock, because he was in a position where eventually he was going to get that authorized--at least he was going to get it out of his committee. And I felt that I had to do it. And frankly, I did talk to Stew about it, and he said, "Yes, I really think that it would be a good thing to do." So I did. And John Tabor.... Well, the thing that had happened was that I had tried to get on the Ways and Means Committee. In fact, Joe Martin had promised me that I could get on the Ways and Means Committee. In fact, Joe Martin had promised me that I could get on the Ways and Means Committee. Well, Joe Martin, bless his heart, was getting senile, and he was just not doing his job as a leader. I decided I'd be for Charlie Halleck. Well, Joe Martin knew that, and so did Dick Simpson who was the ranking Republican on Ways and Means, and instead of getting on Ways and Means, they took Bruce Alger from Texas and put him on, in the place that I would have had. So John Tabor was for Charlie Halleck also. John Tabor was the ranking Republican on the Appropriations Committee. I'm satisfied that John Tabor was
incensed that they had treated me the way they had, and he called me--I didn't call him--he called me and said, "Would you accept an appointment to the Appropriations Committee?" I said, "Yes, I certainly would." So it was very fortuitous, and sometimes I think all of the way things like that fell into place, that the good Lord might have had something to do with it all.

PS: Mr. Rhodes, did you and Congressman Udall frequently have meeting sessions, strategy sessions where you discussed strategy?

JR: Oh, yes, absolutely.

PS: And these would have taken place sometimes in your office, sometimes in Mo's office?

JR: Or on the floor of the House. A lot of things are done behind the brass rail on the floor of the House. Mo and I were very close. We talked about strategy frequently. We just didn't have any secrets from each other as far as Arizona was concerned.

PS: In that stretch run leading up to 1968, when Senator Goldwater was not Senator because of the presidential run, Senator Fannin played a pretty active role also.

JR: Oh, definitely.

PS: Would those meeting sessions have often included him?

JR: Yes. But not always, because Paul had never been in the House, so as far as strategy over on our side was concerned, he would have been a neophyte. But we didn't keep any secrets from him. He was very much a part of the scene.

PS: As we approached toward 1968, Arizona had some other congressmen who had joined the delegation. There was a third district created, and I believe Duke [George F.] Senner....

JR: Duke was elected in 1962, and Sam Steiger was elected in 1964 or 1966, I forget which. But when the chips were down, it was Sam Steiger. He was very helpful.

PS: Did Senner and Steiger get involved also with you and Mo in these meetings as they joined Congress?

JR: We didn't exclude him, but no. He had a different committee at that particular time, and he was the freshman and then a sophomore, I think. I believe Duke served two terms. We were glad to have him, because he had his friends on the Democratic side and he was helpful.

PS: I want to jump back a little bit. I made a note here. In 1954 there was a Bracero Bill, that had some implications for Arizona [JR: It certainly did.] as well as some other
states in the Southwest, I think, also. Could you talk a little bit about... Was Stewart involved, or had he not arrived yet? I don't think he'd arrived yet in Congress when the Bracero...

JR: That's correct.

PS: So what exactly was the implication of the Bracero Bill in 1954, that caused some controversy?

JR: This was the bill which allowed growers, especially, to sign a contract, and that would give them permission to go into Mexico and recruit labor to come back to the United States to harvest crops and do mainly agricultural work. They were called *braceros*. Of course, our agricultural industry in Arizona, you couldn't get help. It just was not available, and this was the only way that they were able to stay in business, so it was important that we renew the Bracero Bill. It was about to expire. I was sort of taking the lead on it. I realized, strangely enough, that although I was a big-city boy, I was the only Republican in the West that had anything to do with agriculture, because the state was largely dependent economically on the proceeds from the agriculture industry. So I made my speech on the floor of the House. Then I went back behind the brass rail and was standing there. I smoked then and I lit a cigarette, and then all of a sudden I heard coming from the gallery, "pop, pop, pop, pop, pop," like back in the old days when you would light a chain of firecrackers and they would go "pop, pop, pop, pop, pop." So I looked up there and realized that something amazing was happening, because this flag had been flown out. There was green and red and so on and so forth. "That must be the flag of Mexico." Then I heard a ricochet. That was a familiar sound, and so I hit the deck right fast. That was when several of the members were actually wounded, and it actually was the Puerto Rican nationalists, not Mexicans. Actually, it had nothing to do with the Bracero Bill, but it just happened that that was the day. We first were blaming Mexicans, but we shouldn't have.

PS: That's what flashed through your mind at first. (JR: Yes.) Was there--in relation to the Bracero Bill--was there opposition in Arizona? I understand the growers....

JR: Well, yes, there was from the agricultural unions--Caesar Chavez's union. They were very much opposed to it, and really shouldn't have been, because they must have known that they didn't have the labor supply to actually harvest these crops. And if we hadn't gotten the *braceros*, the crops would not have been harvested.

PS: And so the fact that the Phoenix Valley growers, Arizona growers--this could also include growers down by Casa Grande also, [JR: Oh, yes!] and so on--there was a real labor shortage then in terms that the growers could not find the people. I understand when the crop had to be picked, you have to have the people to do it.

JR: Yes. And part of the deal that the Department of Agriculture made was that the grower would try his very best to employ people who live in this country, who were citizens. In fact, they made them advertise that at a certain time, a certain place, they
would have trucks ready to take people to the fields to work. And they just weren't able to get 'em. So that's the reason the *braceros* were very welcome.

PS: Mr. Rhodes, I think I'm gonna stop for a second, because I think the first side of my tape's about to run out. So let's take a break, and we'll just stop for a sec?

JR: All right.

PS: So, ending of Side A.